Category Archives: Organized Crime

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June 5, 2013

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Organized Crime

Italian Organised Crime, a silent threat to the European Union and worldwide

By David Ellero, Senior Specialist at Europol

“… do not ever forget, when you hear the progress of lights praised, that the loveliest trick of the Devil is to persuade you that he does not exist”[1].

 

When asked to write on Italian Organised Crime (ITOC), the first thing that comes into my mind is the above mentioned quote, which summarizes the main threat the latter poses to the European Union. In Italy of course the situation is quite different, since the experience Judiciary authorities and Law Enforcement have built up in the course of decades of fights against ITOC have refined both their skills and most importantly their legislative tools.

One for all, the Italian Criminal Code has a specific definition for “Mafia-type Organised Crime”[2] which constitutes a crime per se and identifies the “Mafia” as an Organised Crime Group whose participants:

  • commit criminal offences;
  • Manage or in any way control, either directly or indirectly, economic activities, concessions, authorizations, public contracts and services;
  • Obtain unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or for any other persons;
  • Prevent or limit the freedom to vote, or to get votes for themselves or for other persons on the occasion of an election,

All this by taking advantage of the intimidating power of the association.

 

In Italy it is in fact the condition of submission derived from the intimidating power of the criminal group which is tackled and inherently differentiates a group of criminals perpetrating a crime from a “Mafia-type” organised crime group.

But when I started this article, it was my intention to identify the main threat Italian Organised Crime poses to the European Union and I will therefore move forward.

Whilst in the areas of origin of the main ITOC groups[3] the latter have an extremely tight control over the territory and its population (which effectively constitutes the base of their power, to the point that often little or no crimes are committed without permission from the local Clans) this rarely happens outside, where economic power is sought rather than military.

In this period of economic turmoil, infact, the Italian Mafias face the opposite problem of legitimate businesses: the latter struggle to receive money to invest, the first have too much money and constantly attempt to inject it in the “legitimate” economy.

To give an idea of the scope of these criminal groups and their economic capabilities, the Ndrangheta alone has recently been estimated to have a 44 Billion Euro a year income, 62% of which deriving from drug trafficking alone[4].

At this point it is easy to determine the main threat these groups pose to the EU, which consists in undermining the real economy: since they do not need to produce with a margin of profit (their purpose is mainly money laundering) in the long run little or no legitimate businesses will be able to afford the competition and will be out of the market.

As a simple example, Mafias have always been particularly active in the construction industry and in the real estate market: these two fields are closely related to each other and often investigations uncover large criminal networks that manage to control all the phases related to these crime fields.

In an ideal, simplified scenario:

  • through the power of intimidation deriving from being associated to a Mafia Clan (or through corruption or simply thanks to unlimited economic resources), a certain group can acquire (in or outside Italy) a certain portion of land;
  • through links to the local administrative offices (again, corruption, infiltration or simple intimidation is often enough), the portion of land can change its destination, i.e. from agricultural use to building residential apartments;
  • Mafia-owned (or controlled) construction companies build the residential apartments;
  • Mafia-owned real estate agencies put them on sale on the real estate market;
  • “investors” are called to invest in these residential apartments, and often do so by moving assets through numerous banks located in several different countries, in order to “conceal” their real nature.

Often all the steps above are managed by the same OCG that can therefore create an effective method to launder money without exposing too much to Law Enforcement attention.

Of course if all these steps would take place in Italy, i.e., with the tools provided to the investigators by Italian law it would be quite manageable to identify this scheme and pursue those responsible. This is extremely difficult when the scheme takes place in different countries.

Firstly, as I mentioned at the beginning of this article, in Italy “Mafia” is a crime per se and can therefore be investigated effectively through wiretappings, interceptions and other technical means regardless of the predicate offence. In this scenario the investigative hypothesis would be that Mafia related subjects are carrying out a series of activities to infiltrate the real estate and this would be enough to start up an investigation. An indication that individuals sentenced for Mafia are constantly present of the construction sites or that their relatives or acquaintances are present in the companies that are carrying out the building activities on site is often key to incriminate the latter and confiscate the whole series of properties, in some cases even without a criminal sentence of the suspects[5]

Would these simple indicators be enough for another country to kick off an effective investigation? Would another country wiretap a suspect just based on his affiliation to a Mafia group? These are just a few of the key issues to which the EU legislator (EU Parliament – Committee on Organised Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering – CRIM) is currently trying to find a solution, but this is extremely difficult since EU Member States have extremely different juridical cultures.

In the meanwhile Europol has set up a dedicated project on Italian Organised Crime created to support those countries who wish to fight against these specific syndicates. Because of its position at the centre of the EU’s security architecture Europol is infact best placed to inform its operational partners on the risks linked to the presence of Italian organised crime within their respective boundaries. It’s a first step against an effective and comprehensive anti-Mafia strategy, but the only way to fight these specific OCG is by sharing all information related to them and promoting efficient Law Enforcement cooperation.

[1] Charles Baudelaire, “The Generous Gambler” (1864)

[2] Article 416 bis Italian Criminal Code

[3] Mafia in Sicily, Ndrangheta in Calabria, Camorra in Campania

[4] 2008 EURISPES study

[5] Misure di Prevenzione Patrimoniali

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May 29, 2013

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Arms Trafficking, Human Rights, IHL, Organized Crime, Treaties

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Humanity Hanging on a Cross of Iron: the Arms Trade Treaty Towards Reducing Human Suffering

Written by Lina Laurinaviciute

 

Setting the Scene

The famous Doctor Who once made a splendid remark on the issue of weapons: “You want weapons? […] Books are the best weapon in the world. […] Arm yourself!”[1] Unfortunately, in a real world, the wide availability of different kind weapons and ammunition has led to human suffering, political repression, crime and terror among civilian populations. The flows of arms in all parts of the world can be sourced through diversion from State stockpiles and other legal circuits, recycling from previous conflicts in the concerned State or in the neighbouring countries, State-sponsored supplies to proxies, strategic caches of arms stored in anticipation of conflict, illegal manufacturing and other means.[2]

Irresponsible transfers of conventional weapons[3] destabilize security in a region, enable the violation of the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter – UNSC) arms embargoes and contribute to human rights abuses. Consequently, in countries experiencing conflict and high levels of violence investment is discouraged and hence development is disrupted.[4] It is evident that, the widespread availability of weapons tends to prolong conflicts, facilitate violations of international humanitarian law (also known as law of war or law of armed conflict), and put civilians at high risk of death or injury from weapons-related violence even after armed conflicts have ended.[5]

On 2 April 2013, the UN General Assembly has witnessed an event, to which the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon referred as “a victory for the world’s people.”[6] The UN Member-states voted by 154 votes to three, with 23 abstentions (including Russia and China, which are among the world’s biggest exporters[7]), to control a trade worth between $170 million and $320 million per year.[8] As a consequence, the poorly regulated arms trade has devastating, multifaceted effects. These include fueling violence and armed conflict, hindering efforts to promote socioeconomic development and creating a permanent atmosphere of fear and instability in conflict settings.[9]

Therefore, the Article 2 of the newly adopted Arms Trade Treaty (hereinafter – ATT) sets its scope to regulate the international trade in conventional arms, from small arms to battle tanks. Namely it is applied to: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft; attack helicopters; warships; missiles and missile launchers; and small arms and light weapons.

The treaty prohibits states from exporting conventional weapons in violation of arms embargoes, or weapons that would be used for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or terrorism. It also requires states to prevent conventional weapons reaching the black market. Thus it is expected that it will put a stop to destabilizing arms flows from its signatories to conflict regions. It will prevent human rights abusers and violators of the law of war from being supplied with arms. And it will help keep warlords, pirates, and gangs from acquiring these deadly tools.[10]

Indeed, the majority of modern day intra-State conflicts have been fought mainly with small arms and light weapons. However, recent events in Libya and Syria underscore the continued misuse of heavier conventional weapons – including tanks, heavy artillery, helicopters and aircraft – against civilians. Although it is often difficult to anticipate that a government will eventually use its weaponry against civilian populations, it is expected that the ATT will compel exporters to exercise enhanced diligence in analysing early warning signs that may help them assess the risk that transferred weapons would be used to commit grave human rights violations.[11]

Indeed, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, including man-portable or vehicle-mounted grenades, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, missiles and mortars, can have indiscriminate and devastating impact on civilians, particularly children.[12] For instance, in Yemen, 71 percent of the child conflict casualties in 2009 were a direct result of shelling of civilian areas by all parties to the conflict.[13]

Moreover, the high availability of small arms and the presence of armed violence create threats to humanitarian personnel and can force humanitarian organizations to evacuate their staff from high-risk areas or suspend their programmes, thus depriving affected people of badly needed assistance.[14] For example, in Pakistan, humanitarian actors indicate ongoing hostilities as the most significant impediment to access.[15] Also, the Lord’s Resistance Army since 2009 has carried out armed attacks, including against refugee settlements, in South Sudan, Central African Republic and in the Democratic Republic of Congo during which scores of civilians were killed, thousands of civilians were forced to flee, serious disruptions to the distribution of humanitarian assistance was evident as well.[16]

Beyond fueling armed conflicts, the availability of firearms due to the poorly regulated arms transfers is a major factor sustaining organized crime and terrorism in all regions. The recent events in Libya, for example, presented an opportunity for various criminal and terrorist groups to procure firearms and ammunitions from looted government stockpiles. While Somali pirates reportedly received about US$170 million in ransom in 2011 for hijacked vessels and crews. It is important to mention, that piracy and armed robbery against ships affect the freedom of shipping and the safety of vital shipping lanes, carrying around 90 percent of the world trade.[17]

There is also a specific relationship between firearm availability and high levels of homicide. It is estimated that 42 percent of the overall global homicides are committed with firearms. This percentage is considerably higher in regions where homicides are often associated with the illicit activities of organized criminal groups. In some regions, misuse and illicit trafficking of firearms and their ammunition is often associated with other crimes, in particular drug trafficking. In these situations, the ability of security institutions, such as the police and the military, to enforce the law is greatly diminished in the face of the power of well-armed organized crime groups with ready access to arms in the black market, thus undermining the social fabric of entire communities.[18]

In this regard, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean are the three most affected regions in the world by both arms trafficking and small arms misuse, and share similar challenges fighting against the illicit arms circulation. Interestingly, “the studies on seized arms reveal the use of a variety of arms in street and organized crime. For example, handguns are the preferred weapon used in the commission of most street crime, while military-style arms are used by organized criminals, such as by the drug cartels in Mexico and in the favelas in Brazil.”[19]

The problem of a poorly regulated arms trade was well noted by the UN, which stated that: “the absence of a global framework regulating the international trade in all conventional arms has obscured transparency, comparability and accountability.”[20] However, it took almost a decade to agree on principles to control the flow of such arms.

The Birth of the Treaty

Unlike trade in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, trade in conventional weapons was not regulated in a comprehensive treaty at the international level.[21] The initiative on the current principles of the ATT have been started by Dr. Oscar Arias who in 1995, led a group of fellow Nobel Peace Prize Laureates in announcing their support for the international regulation of the trade in conventional arms. Of the many advocacy initiatives undertaken in support of the ATT, the “Million Faces Petition” of the Control Arms campaign gained the greatest international attention. The Petition, which comprised individual portraits as expressions of support, was formally submitted to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in June 2006.[22]

After some months, the process within the UN system began with General Assembly Resolution 61/89 of December 2006 entitled “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms”.[23] In this resolution, the General Assembly requested countries to submit their views on the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms. Following those views, the General Assembly adopted a second resolution on an ATT (Resolution 63/240) in 2008. In this resolution the UN General Assembly decided to establish an open ended working group, which would be open to all states, to further consider the possible elements of the future agreement on the arms trade.[24]

A year after, in 2009, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 64/48 in which UN member states decided to convene a UN conference on an Arms Trade Treaty in 2012 with the scope “to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms”[25]. Importantly, under the US administration of President Barack Obama, the US changed its position and after voting against the ATT in 2006 and 2008, it finally supported this process. Undoubtedly, this support was conditional on success of the future negotiations as well as for the agreement being reached in consensus.[26]

After years of advocacy for a worldwide ATT and four intensive weeks of diplomatic bargaining, in July 2012 the UN convened a conference to negotiate a legally binding arms trade treaty. Unfortunately, the final negotiation round did not result in an agreement to which all 193 countries of the UN could commit. At the end of the negotiations, the US blocked an agreement by declaring that it needed more time to reach a consensus. Russia, North Korea, Cuba and Venezuela supported this position. It was mutually agreed, however, that: “Arms export controls can only be effective if implemented at the global level, in a coherent and consistent manner”[27] as the “poorly regulated trade in conventional arms and ammunition fuels conflict, poverty and human rights abuses all over the world”[28]. Therefore, it was decided to continue negotiations at the next years (2013) conference with a view to concluding the ATT. Finally, the treaty was adopted in April, 2013.

A Glance Inside the Treaty

The preamble of the treaty recognizes “that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those affected by armed conflict and armed violence”[29] and “the challenges faced by victims of armed conflict and their need for an adequate care, rehabilitation and social and economic inclusion.”[30] The treaty also recalls that States Parties to the treaty are determined to act in accordance with the duty to ensure respect to IHL.”[31] One of the purposes of the treaty is to reduce human suffering by establishing the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms.[32] To reach these goals, the treaty sets forth the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, transparency and universality.

As mentioned before, the Article 2 of the treaty sets out the scope of conventional arms to which the treaty shall apply. It explicitly refers to the seven major categories of conventional arms already included in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, plus small arms[33] and light weapons[34]. Ammunition, munitions, and parts and components for these conventional arms are also covered in Articles 3 and 4.

Article 2 also includes activities to which the treaty shall apply: These are “activities of the international trade” that comprise export, import, transit, trans-shipment, and brokering. Particularly, it aims to prevent and suppress illicit production, trafficking and illicit brokering of conventional arms.

However, the ATT “does not aim to impede or interfere with the lawful ownership and use of weapons.”[35] According to the ATT, Governments remain primarily responsible for keeping to the rule of law. However, before approving the transfers of weapons or ammunition, States Parties to the ATT are required to assess the risk that transferred arms would be used by national armed and security forces, private security companies or other armed State or non-State actors to foment regional instability, to commit grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law (e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes) or to engage in other forms of politically or criminally motivated armed violence (e.g. terrorism; transnational organised crime, corruption). The common standards should also help States to assess the risk that transferred arms will end up in areas proscribed by UNSC embargoes.[36]

Moreover, States Parties must establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list of weapons and items covered. They must also maintain national records of export authorizations or actual exports, and report on their implementation of the treaty as well as authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms (but not ammunition or parts and components).[37]

The treaty will open for signature on June 3, 2013 at UN headquarters in New York. It will enter into force 90 days following the 50th ratification, acceptance, or approval with the Depositary.[38] Despite the poor monitoring mechanism (the Conference of States parties has a function to review implementation, and consider amendments and issues relating to the treaty interpretation) “the text now has to be implemented in good faith so as to positively affect the lives, health and well-being of millions of people around the world. If properly implemented, it will prevent arms transfers when there is a manifest risk that war crimes or serious violations of human rights will be committed.”[39]

Prospects of the Treaty

Without adequate regulation of international arms transfers based on high common standards to guide national decisions on these transfers, it is easier for arms to be diverted to the illicit market for use in armed conflict, criminal activities and violence, including organized crime groups.[40] With every transfer it authorizes, a government deciding on exporting weapons must realize the profound international responsibility of that decision. And conversely, an importing government must ensure that it will use these weapons only to provide the safety and security for its people and that it has the capacity to safeguard all weapons within its possession throughout their life cycle.[41]

Undoubtedly, the ATT is a significant milestone on the way towards the goal to reduce the flows of the illicit arms and to reduce human suffering. However, this treaty lacks specific indicators as well as specific provisions about arms transfer towards non-State Actors. Furthermore, the obligation of reporting and the monitoring system suggested by the ATT is hardly sufficient for its successful implementation. The treaty also does not pay enough attention to the criminalization of illicit conducts.

Unfortunately, each weakness in the treaty as well as resistance of states on reaching the substantial agreements on the arms trade has a huge cost of human life and dignity. Those suffering the most from the adverse effects of the arms trade are men, women, girls and boys trapped in situations of armed violence and conflict, often in conditions of poverty, deprivation and extreme inequality, where they are all too frequently on the receiving end of the misuse of arms by State armed and security forces, non-State armed groups and criminal gangs.[42] As President Dwight D. Eisenhower well mentioned: “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. […] Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron.”[43]

[1] Doctor Who, “Tooth and Claw”, Russell T. Davies.

[2] UNODA Occasional Papers, The Impact of the Poorly Regulated Arms Transfers on the Work of the United Nations, United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), 2013, p. 3.

[3] A conventional weapon can be defined as a weapon that is neither a nuclear, biological nor a chemical weapon (i.e. not a weapon of mass destruction).

[4] UNODA, About the Arms Trade, available at: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTrade/>, (Last visited on 27 May, 2013).

[5] ICRC, Arms Trade Treaty: A historic step towards reducing human suffering, available at: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2013/02-04-weapons-arms-trade-treaty.htm>, (Last visited on 27 May, 2013).

[6] See supra note 4.

[7] The biggest arm suppliers: US, Russia, China, Ukraine, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Spain. See also: BBC, UN passes historic arms trade treaty by huge majority, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21998394>, (Last visited on 27 May, 2013).

[8] The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.IV.6, 2010.

[9] See supra note 2, p. 1.

[10] See supra note 4.

[11] See supra note 2, p.6.

[12] Ibid., p. 24.

[13] Save the Children, Devastating Impact: Explosive weapons and children, 2011, p. 5.

[14] See supra note 2, p.19.

[15] Ibid., p. 12.

[16] UNHCR News, 14 May 2010.

[17] See supra note 2, p. 23.

[18] Ibid., p. 20.

[19] Ibid., p. 16.

[20] Ibid., p. 2.

[21] Holtom, P. and Wezeman, S. T., Towards an arms trade treaty?, SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, 2007.

[22] Control Arms Campaign, Million Faces Petition, available at: <http://www.controlarms.org/million_faces/index.php>, (Last visited on 28 May, 2013).

[23] Bailey L., The Foreign Policy Centre Briefing Towards an Arms Trade Treaty, available at: <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/1232.pdf>, (Last visited on 28 May, 2013).

[24] The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, The European Union’s Involvement in Negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty, No. 23 December 2012, p. 3.

[25] UN General Assembly Resolution 64/48, 12 January 2010.

[26] See supra note 24, p. 3.

[27] Ibid. p. 2.

[28] Ibid.

[29] UN General Assembly, The Arms Trade Treaty, A/CONF.217/2013/L.3, Preamble.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] See supra note 5.

[33] Revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns. See also: UN, General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/Firstcom/SGreport52/a52298.html>, (Last visited on 27 May, 2013).

[34] Heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS); and mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm. See also: UN, General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/Firstcom/SGreport52/a52298.html>, (Last visited on 27 May, 2013).

[35] See supra note 4.

[36] See supra note 2, p. 3.

[37] See supra note 24, p.13.

[38] See supra note 29, Article 22.

[39] See supra note 5.

[40] See supra note 2, p. 21.

[41] See supra note 5.

[42] See supra note 2, p. 2.

[43] The Chance for Peace speech given by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower on April 16, 1953.

* Picture source: Reuters.

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May 27, 2013

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Human Trafficking, Victims Rights

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Children as Victims of Trafficking in India

Written by Garima Tiwari

sctnow india-child-labour_1570360i

( http://www.glogster.com and http://www.gandhiforchildren.org)

The recent case of an Indian new-born baby allegedly sold for 800,000 rupees ($ 14,750) over Facebook, opened up many questions on the prevalence and working of child trafficking racket in the country. The boy, born in a hospital in Ludhiana in the northern state of Punjab, was sold twice before the deal on the social networking site. The infant’s grandfather allegedly first snatched the child from his own daughter, telling her he had been stillborn, to sell him to a nurse for 45,000 rupees. The nurse, in turn, reportedly sold the baby for 300,000 rupees to a hospital lab assistant. The infant was then allegedly put up for sale on Facebook by the lab assistant, and a businessman from New Delhi is accused of offering 800,000 rupees for him after seeing photographs. The police raided the businessman’s house and recovered the child. They also arrested five people including the grandfather and another man accused of facilitating the deals. Tens of thousands of children in India are thought to be trafficked every year, some for adoption but also many for bonded labour, begging or sexual exploitation.[i] That is hardly the experience of most parents. Since 2007, when the exposure of a serial killer in Nithari, on the outskirts of New Delhi, revealed that local police had ignored parents’ pleas that their children had disappeared, evidence has piled up showing that officials continue to disregard complaints of missing children.[ii]

Many, many such incidents are repeatedly reported with multitude of reasons for trafficking and sad implications. Take for example, Smita a sixteen year old girl was taken from her village in Jharkhand, India and subjected to various forms of sexual abuse and exploitation at the hand of her employers including rape. When rescued her parents refused to take her back since she had been tainted by rape. Falling sex ratios in Haryana and Punjab has led to a need for trafficking of brides from villages in Orissa, Jharkhand, Bihar, Assam and West Bengal, who have been sold off by the parents. Jyoti, age fourteen, was sold and married to a 40-year old man for Rs 15,000 in order to produce a mail heir[iii]

This post highlights the need for urgent action by the authorities to fight child trafficking in India. A huge number of children from a place called Tarai in Nepal are trafficked to India everyday and they fall victims to child labor. Approximately 90,000 children went missing in India in 2011 alone. Nearly half of these cases remain unsolved. Thus, while there is movement of children through procurement and sale from one country to another, with India being both a supplier as well as a “consumer”, there is internal “movement” of children within the country itself – one town to another, one district to another and one state to another. It is undertaken in an organised manner, by organised syndicates or by individuals, and sometimes informal groups. Relatives and parents are part of this as well.[iv] Children as young as 5 years are sold to traffickers by their parents who are in need of money and brought to India.  These children are trafficked to various parts of India like Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata and are made to work in cloth factories, have to stitch bags and perform various hazardous and odd jobs. [v] In 2012 about 250 Nepali children were rescued from the India-Nepal border. There are number of unregistered orphanages in Nepal which are trafficking children to different parts of the world and Indian human rights activists speculate that there are thousands of Nepali children who work in India. In March 2013, 38 tribal children, including 32 minors were rescued who were being taken by train for bonded labor. [vi]Their parents were given an advance amount of Rs 1,000 for a bonded labour of 40 days for the children, to work at the under construction site of railway tracks in Nagpur in India. The agents involved in trafficking usually give these minor girls the look of a married woman so that they are not easily caught. The boys were to be paid a daily wage of Rs 160 and girls Rs 150.

The chart below shows some of the methods of trafficking:

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Chart taken from the Manual For Social Workers : Dealing with child victims of trafficking and commercial sex exploitation[vii]

The Indian Constitution under Article 23 specifically prohibits human trafficking, asserting that all citizens have the right to be protected from exploitation. Article 36 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides for protection of children from exploitation and physical and psychological recovery and article 39 of the CRC provides for the social reintegration of child victims of exploitation. In India, various laws like Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act of 2000 (JJA), Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act of 1956 (ITPA) amended in 1986, and the like, are providing support, care, and protection to these children in various State Homes across the country.

In June 2011, India ratified the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, which supplemented the 2000 UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime. India’s response to the problem of trafficking has been considerably influenced by its Trafficking in Person (TIP )Report rankings. The definition of trafficking under the UN TIP Protocol is the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons” by using “force[,] . . . coercion, abduction, fraud, [and] deception” to control and exploit another person, including, but not limited to, sex exploitation.Between 2001 and 2003, India figured in Tier Two of the TIP Report before being demoted to the Tier Two Watch List. It was only in May 2011 when India ratified the UN Protocol that it made its way once again into the Tier Two List. India’s response to the trafficking problem in terms of abolishing trafficking isn’t unique in the sub-continent. Indeed, the 2002 SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children defines trafficking as sex trafficking following a 1949 UN Convention, rather than the 2000 UN Protocol.[viii]

While India has ratified the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Trafficking in Persons, without reservation, and enacted ITPA in response showing its intention to fight trafficking, Section 7 of the said act which penalizes those who prostitute in or near public places, and Section 8, which penalizes the solicitation of sex, both of which have in practice justified the police’s arrest and imprisonment of trafficked women who have been forced into prostitution and who have no knowledge or control over the brothel’s proximity to public places. Amending the law to exclude Sections 7 and 8 would decriminalize the activities of trafficking victims who are forced to solicit for sex. In 2006, a bill to amend the ITPA was proposed by India’s Ministry of Women and Child Development, which would decriminalize prostitution and instead would penalize prostitutes’ clients. The law currently contains provisions that penalize brothel owners, managers, and traffickers. The Ministry of Home Affairs also set up specialized police units in major Indian cities in 2011 with the sole task of investigating sex trafficking cases and arresting traffickers and brothel owners and managers. These police officers were specially trained and sensitized to understand how trafficking rings operate. However, the police lack the resources to investigate and make arrests on every trafficking case. [ix] Even after arrest the judicial process is so slow that while one is being put under trial, the whole trafficking ring keeps flourishing.

The recent Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013 recognises trafficking as an offence in the Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code . This is on the similar lines as the Palermo Protocol, also ratified by India in May 2011, following a Supreme Court judgement defining trafficking in a public interest litigation (PIL) field by Bachpan Bachao Andolan in 2011. The bill targets the entire process that leads to trafficking of a person and also makes the employment of a trafficked person and subsequent sexual exploitation a specific offence under Section 370 A.[x] While the old section 370 of Indian Penal Code dealt with only buying or disposing of any person as a slave the new section will take in its purview buying or disposing of any person for various kinds of exploitation including slavery. This provision includes organ trade as well. As the explanation further clarifies “exploitation” would also include prostitution. This is in addition to the ITP Act, 1956. The new section also ensures that persons involved at each and every stage of trafficking chain are brought within the criminal justice system.Also by specifically including that if a person is brought with his/her consent, where such consent is obtained through force, coercion, fraud, deception or under abuse of power, the same will amount to trafficking, the law has been substantially strengthened. This will cover all situations where girls who happen to be major are duped with promises of marriage and willingly accompany the traffickers who exploit them in various ways. While earlier no specific offence was made out for the mere bringing of the girl in question now that too is criminalized.  It has also been specifically added in the provision that consent of the victim is immaterial for the determination of the offence.The new section also differentiates the instances of trafficking major persons from minor persons. This differentiation is brought about by providing separate penalty for each with higher minimum sentence for trafficking minor persons.In addition the section also provides for enhanced punishment for repeated offender as well as where the offender traffics more than one person at the same time. By providing that trafficking in minor persons on a repeated conviction will attract imprisonment for life (meaning the remaining natural life) the law has been substantially changed.[xi] This will surely act as a big deterrent. Involvement of a public servant including a police officer shall entitle him to life imprisonment which shall mean the remaining natural life.[xii] Addition of the section 370 A further adds strength to trafficking related law by criminalizing employment of a trafficked (major/minor) person. A person who has even reason to believe or apprehension that the minor/major person employed by them has been trafficked will make them criminally liable. This places a huge responsibility on the employers who were till now, let off easily under the not so strict provisions of the child labour laws and juvenile related laws.  Here also a higher minimum prison term is prescribed where a minor person is involved. Also important is the fact that irrespective of age of the person employed, simply employing a trafficked person is an offence. This provision will go a long way in ensuring that people verify the antecedents of the placement agencies as also get the police verification of the persons employed. This will also aide in curbing the huge demand for labour who are victims of unsafe migration.[xiii]

The enactment of the law on paper with no real training and support to the functionaries would be futile and therefore, what is needed now is “actual”, “planned” and “effective” implementation. Involving the community participation in the whole implementation process would create a greater impact. The procedures and technicalities should not reduce the ambitious legislations to empty words, because at stake here are the children- the future of the nation.

(For those who want to get a deeper understand of the brutality of the child trafficking rackets I recommend the movie recently screened at the Cannes Film Festival on May 22 titled: “Oass- The Dew Drop”, which is inspired by a real-life story of abduction of an 11-year-old Nepalese girl who is sold to a brothel in Delhi by her aunt. (http://www.youtube.com/user/OassTheFilm))

[i] Police Rescue Indian baby allegedly sold on facebook, April 24, 2013 available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/police-rescue-indian-baby-allegedly-sold-on-facebook/article4650168.ece

[ii] Jason Overdorf, Indian Chilld Trafficking on the Rise, May 5, 2013 available at http://www.salon.com/2013/05/05/child_trafficking_in_india_on_the_rise_partner/

[iv] Child Trafficking in India available at http://www.haqcrc.org/publications/child-trafficking-india

[v] Darker Side of India: Child Trafficking on the Rise,27th March 2013, available at  http://www.siliconindia.com/news/general/Darker-Side-of-India-Child-Trafficking-on-the-Rise-nid-144134-cid-1.html

[vi] Rashmi Drolia,Child Trafficking: 38 Children Rescued from Railway Station, 15th March 2013,available at  http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-03-15/raipur/37744973_1_railway-station-tribal-children-needy-children

[viii] Prabha Kotiswaran, India has to rethink human trafficking, The Hindu Business Line, march 27th 2012, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/india-has-to-rethink-human-trafficking/article3251458.ece

[ix] Anusree Garg, Anti Trafficking Legislation Inadequately Combatting Sex Trafficking in India, March 2013, The Human Rights Brief, available at The Human Rights Brief, http://hrbrief.org/2013/03/anti-trafficking-legislation-inadequately-combating-sex-trafficking-in-india/

[x] India Prohibits All forms of Trafficking, March 21st, 2013, Bachpan Bachao Andolan available at http://www.bba.org.in/news/210313.php

[xiii] Ibid

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March 22, 2013

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Organized Crime, Terrorism, Treaties

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Organized Crime & Terrorism: Making Room for New Friends

Written by: Regina Paulose

The bond between organized criminals and terrorists appear to be growing in the status quo. This connection should be worrisome as these networks have found common interests. Considering the different objectives of each group, some may question whether they truly have anything in common. Terrorists are generally motivated by politics, whereas organized enterprises are motivated by money. Despite this philosophical difference in the bottom line, some examples prove that this connection is strong. “In some cases terrorists and criminals appear to be deeply intertwined in ways that go well beyond fleeting alliances of convenience. The Dubai-based Indian criminal Aftab Ansari is believed to have used ransom money he earned from kidnappings to help fund the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. And some people, like the Pakistan-based Indian crime boss Dawood Ibrahim, even go on to pursue dual careers as both criminal and terrorist leaders.”[1]

Despite the different goals of the two illicit groups, differentiating between the two – sometimes – can be challenging. Terrorists are involved in the black market in order to generate needed revenue.[2]  This revenue is what allows them to pursue their political or religious agendas.[3] Organized criminals have resorted to modeling violent techniques which are used by terrorists to advance their monetary agendas.[4] “Criminal organizations can become ideological over time, following the path of terrorist groups.”[5]  Many famous mafia stories highlight how monetary gain is closely tied with political power. The more power the illicit group yields, the easier it becomes to allow the black market to flourish. Who these groups are and who they can turn into poses a challenge for the rule of law everywhere.

So how do the international conventions address this particular bond?[6] The United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), which entered into force in 2003, is the main international legal instrument which deals with organized crime.[7]  The Convention is accompanied by three Protocols which deal with human trafficking, smuggling, and arms trafficking. The Convention aims to criminalize participation in organized crime, increase cooperation among state parties, and protect human rights. Given its mandate, naturally, UNTOC does not address the issue of the organized crime – terrorism nexus. With a very broad reading, one could infer that the UNTOC may address this issue. For instance, Article 5 of the Convention calls for criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group. The language of Article 5(ii) states:

Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active part in:

a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal group;

b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in the knowledge that his or her participation will contribute to the achievement of the above-described criminal aim.

An argument could be made that a terrorist who purchases a weapon from or supplies weapons to an organized group is taking “active part” in the “criminal activities” of the group. Or even the language of section (b) makes it clear that if the terrorist has “knowledge” that his participation will “contribute” to the criminal aim, he could be penalized for his association.

This example should serve as a cautionary tale. We must avoid conflating the two groups because it could pose its own set of legal challenges, especially considering that terrorism is mainly viewed via the law of war. If terrorists are engaging in the same activity as organized criminals, it is probably safe to assume that these operations are a means to an end.

Another international instrument to consider is the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism. This particular Convention expressly deals with punishing perpetrators who finance terrorism. Under Article 2, any person could be held culpable for directly or indirectly facilitating, participating in, or aiding or abetting in the commission of various offenses as listed in the annex of the Convention.[8] Some of the offenses listed are: unlawful seizure of an aircraft, taking of hostages, terrorist bombings, endangering the safety of civilian aircrafts, and endangering maritime vessels. This particular Convention could provide relief against this particular nexus, depending on how it is enacted domestically.

The international community has recognized that terrorists do use different resources to accomplish their aims. In 2006 the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Specifically one of the aims of the “holistic” strategy is:

“to strengthen coordination and cooperation among States in combating crimes that might be connected with terrorism, including drug trafficking in all its aspects, illicit arms trade, in particular of small arms and light weapons, including man-portable air defence systems, money laundering and smuggling of nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological and other potentially deadly materials.”[9]

While many scholars still argue that the link between these villains is “nebulous”[10] and that the empirical data to support that the groups are working together is little, there still appears to be a small link, at the very least, that should be acknowledged by the rule of law. It is probably time to address the importance of these issues and make the necessary changes required to have states implement more robust language in their national laws. The state parties to these conventions may not have envisioned a world where the underbelly of society forms alliances (however brief) to achieve their various goals. Unfortunately that is the current reality and it seems as though it is far more than a passing trend.

[1] Rolle Lal, “Terrorists and Organized Crime Join Forces” NYT Opinion, May 24, 2005, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/23/opinion/23iht-edlal.html?_r=0

[2] See David Kaplan, “Paying for Terror” US News and World Report, November 27, 2005, available at: http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051205/5terror.htm

[4] Karen Parrish, “Link Grows Between Terrorism, Organized Crime, Officials Say” American Forces Press Service, March 28, 2012, available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67721

[5] Lal , as cited above

[6] My analysis for the purposes of this post is limited to two Conventions and is not meant to be an exhaustive or comprehensive look at every single treaty that exists and could potentially address this problem. For anyone wanting more information on finding treaties or researching this issue in depth, I suggest referring to the UN Treaty Collection: http://treaties.un.org/Home.aspx?lang=en

[7] The “guardian” of the instrument is the UNODC. For more information on the UNTOC visit: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html

[8] International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, available at: http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-11.pdf

[9] UN Action to Counter Terrorism, A/RES/60/288,  September 20, 2006,  p.5 available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement

[10] Annette Hübschle, From Theory to Practice: Exploring the Organized Crime-Terror Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa, Perspectives on Terrorism (Journal), Vol.5 No 3-4 (2011), available at: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/157/html

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January 2, 2013

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Drug Trafficking, International Court of Justice, Law of the Sea

A Note On The ICJ Judgement In NICARAGUA v COLOMBIA and its relevance to International Crime and Criminal Law

Written by: Professor Steven Haines[1]

On 19 November 2012 in The Hague, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) handed down its Judgement in the case between Nicaragua and Colombia concerning the two States’ dispute over territory and maritime jurisdiction in the south-western region of the Caribbean.[2] The following day, Claire O’Neill McCleskey posted an article on the InSightCrime website in which she raised the possibility that the Court’s decision would have negative consequences in relation to the combating of serious crime in the region.[3]   What was it about the case that prompted this immediate reaction – and was that reaction justified?  Indeed, are there any international criminal law consequences of the Judgement?  The aim of this note is to provide a brief account of the case, its background and the manner in which the Court dealt with it, and to follow that up with some comment on whether or not there are likely to be significant consequences in relation to international crime and criminal law.

Background to the Case

The case was initiated by Nicaragua in December 2001.  Seventy-three years earlier, the 1928 Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty had dealt with issues of sovereignty of islands in the region and for some time after that there was no obvious dispute between the two States.  There were certainly no maritime boundary issues because, in 1928, the only cause for such would have been a dispute over overlapping claims to three nautical mile territorial seas; the islands were so far offshore (over 100 nautical miles) that this was simply not an issue – or regarded as potentially so.

On the basis of its interpretation of the 1928 treaty, Colombia exercised sovereignty over several islands that were in very much closer proximity to the Nicaraguan coast than they were to Colombia’s.  Three island groups in particular – San Andres, Providencia and Santa Catalina – were habitable islands that were expressly dealt with in the 1928 treaty.  Today they are important tourist destinations in the region.  San Andres (pop: 70,000) is just over 100 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast, while Providencia (pop: 5,000) and Santa Catalina are about 50 nautical miles to the north east of San Andres and about 125 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast.  All three islands are in the region of 380 nautical miles from the Colombian coast.  Two other physical features located to the north of San Andres, Providencia and Santa Catalina – Quitasueňo and Serrana – are very low lying, uninhabited banks or cays that were not expressly covered by the provisions of the 1928 treaty but which Colombia has always since then regarded as its territory.  There was, though, some doubt as to the extent to which Quitasueno remained dry at high tide, a factor that the Court was required to consider.  If it remained above sea level at high tide, it would be classed as an island and would generate a territorial sea – although almost certainly not an EEZ, as to do so it would need to be able to sustain human habitation or economic life under Article 121(3) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS).  If it was submerged at high tide it would not qualify for island status, would not be appropriable as sovereign territory, and could not, therefore, generate a territorial sea or any other jurisdictional zone.

At the time the 1928 treaty was negotiated, the potential for substantial resource exploitation in the waters between the two States had not been a consideration and had not influenced the terms of the treaty. The islands claimed by Colombia generated a three mile territorial sea but Colombian sovereignty over them had relatively little geo-political, legal or, indeed, economic, impact on the region.  As the resources of the continental shelf emerged as a significant factor shaping the law of the sea in the second half of the twentieth century, however, the terms of the 1928 treaty increasingly came to be seen by Nicaragua as disadvantageous. Colombian sovereignty over the islands would have substantial impact as newly extended coastal state jurisdiction was established.  The location of the islands had the potential greatly to restrict the extent of Nicaraguan continental shelf and exclusive economic claims while at the same time giving Colombia a disproportionately large area of jurisdiction.  Nicaragua came to regard the situation as inequitable in the new era of extended jurisdiction and maritime resource exploitation, especially given the fact that the islands at the heart of the dispute were three times as distant from the Colombian mainland as they were from the Nicaraguan.  The latter began to challenge Colombian sovereignty of the islands. The result was that the claims of both States to continental shelf and exclusive economic jurisdiction overlapped significantly and the dispute intensified as the potential for economic exploitation increased.

In very general terms, this is the historical background to the dispute (more detail can be found in the Court’s Judgement and in the papers presented by both sides during the case.) Nicaragua took the case to the ICJ confident that the Court would award it sovereignty over key islands.  It then expected the Court to define a maritime boundary using Nicaraguan sovereignty of the islands to establish its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in substantial areas previously claimed by Colombia.  Colombia, on the other hand, while reluctant to place the dispute with the Court, was anticipating a rejection of Nicaraguan claims for sovereignty over the islands, which it assumed would leave the Colombian claimed continental shelf and EEZ largely intact.

The Progress of the Case and the Court’s Judgement

The Court took seventeen days short of eleven years to reach its Judgement. One might ask why it took so long.  The answer lies in a combination of procedural requirements, the need for the Court initially to consider its own jurisdiction before moving on to the merits of the dispute itself, and technical complexities.

Following Nicaragua’s filing of its Application in 2001, there followed the usual promulgation by the Court of deadlines for the submission of the Nicaraguan Memorial and the Colombian Counter-Memorial; these were set for April and June 2003 respectively.  In July 2003, however, Colombia raised preliminary objections as to the Court’s jurisdiction and the proceedings on the merits were duly suspended.  Public hearings on the preliminary objections were held in June 2007 and the Court handed down its judgement on these in December that year.  With one important exception (see below), it concluded that it did have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute.

Colombia was then given a new deadline of 11 November 2008 to submit its Counter-Memorial on the merits.  This was met and there followed a further round of deadlines for a Nicaraguan Reply (18 September 2009) and a Colombian Rejoinder (18 June 2010).  Public hearings on the merits were eventually held between 23 April and 4 May 2012, with the Judgement handed down six months later.

Maritime boundary disputes are frequently complicated by technical factors and this was certainly true in this case, in which hydrographic evidence concerning maritime features and tidal effects was submitted to the Court by both parties. Their representatives in the proceedings included both legal counsel and scientific and technical advisers, and each party challenged the other’s scientific and technical methodologies in the process.  The principal technical issues in focus in relation to the question of sovereignty were to do with whether or not certain physical features qualified as islands or cays, or were merely raised banks that only dried at some point below high tide. The precise physical characteristics of the features and of the tides that affected them were important in determining whether or not it was possible for either State to claim them as territory and whether they would then, as a consequence, generate extensions of coastal state jurisdiction (territorial jurisdiction, exclusive economic jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over the continental shelf).  Following the determination of sovereignty, further technical details were to do with the construction of the single maritime boundary delimiting the two States’ continental shelves and EEZs.

While the time taken to reach the Judgement following Nicaragua’s initiation of the case may appear unduly excessive to those unfamiliar with the ICJ’s proceedings, it was by no means unusual, and the technical issues were also complex.  The time was necessary for all of the details of the case to be thoroughly researched and presented and then analysed by the Court.

Nicaragua submitted the dispute to the ICJ to achieve two objectives: first, a ruling that it has sovereignty of various islands and cays located between Nicaragua and Colombia; and, second, the delimitation by the Court of the maritime boundary between the two States.  One can see that Nicaragua wished to be granted sovereignty of certain islands in order to maximise the extent of its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone – the islands having a potentially significant influence on the extent of the resource zones that would be partially generated by them.

While the case was reasonably complex at the technical level, we need only briefly state its outcome.  The result was somewhat unexpected from the point of view of both parties.  To start with, the Court had concluded in its Judgement on Colombia’s Preliminary Objections that it had no jurisdiction to consider Nicaragua’s claim to the islands of San Andres, Providencia and Santa Catalina because sovereignty had been determined in Colombia’s favour by the 1928 treaty.  In effect, it was ruling in favour of Colombian claims to sovereignty over the islands.  It also confirmed Colombian sovereignty over various other islands, including Quitesueno and Serrana.  What it then went on to do was acknowledge the need, for reasons of equity, to grant no significance to Quitesueno and Serrana in relation to delimitation of the continental shelf or EEZ.  While Colombia has the right to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea around these islands, it has no prospect of relying on them to generate either a continental shelf or an EEZ. The islands were effectively left as Colombian territorial enclaves within the Nicaraguan continental shelf and EEZ.  While welcoming the Court’s decision over sovereignty, Colombia effectively lost the case in the final analysis because of the extensive sea area (approximately 30,000 square miles of ocean) it lost as a result of the ruling.

The Impact of the Case on International Crime and Criminal Law

It must be said that on first reflecting on this case, it appears to have no substantial relevance to international criminal law at all.  As already explained, it was to do with rival maritime claims that, while producing tension, had not previously resulted in the parties to the dispute resorting to force.  One narrow definition of ‘international criminal law’ is that implied in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression. Unless war were to break out between the two States, it is virtually impossible to imagine circumstances in which the case would have relevance to ICC-based criminal law.

Both Nicaragua and Colombia have accepted the Court’s Judgement, although the latter feels aggrieved by it.  Apart from initially challenging the ICJ’s jurisdiction, Colombia has subsequently been highly critical of its ruling.  Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos, declared on 28 November that the Judgement was ‘unjust and erroneous’ and announced that his government would ‘no longer recognise the World Court in border disputes’.[4] He went on to say, however, that Colombia’s ‘emphatic rejection’ of the resultant maritime boundary would not result in any extra-legal action; it will only rely on international legal processes to challenge it.  It must be said that it is difficult to imagine what legal processes Colombia now intends to resort to.  The ICJ’s Judgement is final and there is no avenue for appeal against a Court Judgement, which is legally binding on the parties.  Despite post-Judgement rhetoric, Colombia has so far not acted irresponsibly in relation to it and remains within the law.  On current assessment, its disappointment with the Judgement seems unlikely to cause the dispute to rumble on, and certainly not to the extent that force will be deployed (which would raise questions concerning aggression and the application of the law of armed conflict/international humanitarian law).  We can reasonably hope that the dispute has been resolved peacefully and that both parties will respect that.

We can also reasonably rule out the possibility of this case having any relevance to ICC-based international criminal law.  If, however, we adopt a broader definition of what constitutes ‘international crime’ there is at least a suggestion that the Judgement has consequences.  A broader definition arguably includes all serious crimes having a significant international dimension.  Given the international nature of the oceans, crimes committed at sea will almost invariably have potentially significant international dimensions.

One group of crimes with profound international consequences is to do with the manufacture, sale and trafficking of illicit narcotics.  These activities are a seriously worrying feature in the Central American/Caribbean region, with Colombia itself a major source of illicit narcotics, with cartels like the Medellin, Cali and Norte del Valle extensively engaged in the production and export of drugs into North America, using maritime routes through the region.  It was the narcotics problem in the region that prompted McCleskey to post her article and to ask whether the Court’s ruling would be ‘Good news for drug traffickers’.  Her interjection was perhaps a little surprising, but it clearly demands some consideration, at the very least.

Unfortunate Consequences for Law Enforcement?

The thrust of McCleskey’s article was that the substantial reduction in the extent of Colombia’s maritime jurisdiction and consequential increase in Nicaragua’s, combined with the latter’s relatively weak navy, would undermine efforts to combat the narcotics trafficking activities of drugs cartels operating out of Colombian territory and using the waters off Nicaragua to traffic narcotics from Colombia to the United States (see map below).  A key consideration is that a number of criminal groups operating out of Colombia have recently been using sea routes through the San Andres islands.  This activity has been targeted by the Colombian navy but, McCleskey suggests, Colombia’s loss of jurisdiction over waters very close to the islands will undermine these efforts.  To quote from her article:

‘……the withdrawal of the Colombian Navy, from what are now Nicaraguan waters, may benefit drug traffickers operating in the region, among them the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Urabenos, due to the comparative weakness of the Nicaraguan Navy. Colombia…..has a large, modernized navy, while Nicaragua’s navy is small and relatively low-tech.’

intersight

Source: www.InSightCrime.org

According to The Economist newspaper, in an article published on 8 December 2012, ‘Nicaragua celebrated (the Judgement) by dispatching ships to patrol its new waters. “By now [the navy has] established sovereignty in that whole territory,” said Daniel Ortega, its president’.  This comment was from an article that also included the map below.[5]  That map, as well as the title of The Economist article, makes reference to Colombian (and ‘former Colombian’) ‘territorial waters’.  When coupled with the quote from Daniel Ortega, in which he refers to the Nicaraguan navy having established ‘sovereignty in that whole territory’ judged by the ICJ to be within Nicaragua’s continental shelf and EEZ, an uninformed reader may gain the wholly erroneous impression that the waters in question now have the status of Nicaraguan territory.  The same impression is gained from a reading of McCleskey’s article on the possibility of the Court’s ruling advantaging Colombian drug cartels and those trafficking their wares.  The two articles reinforce each other’s fundamental misunderstanding of the juridical status of the waters subject to the ICJ’s Judgement.

The Economist

Source: The Economist, 8 Dec 12

The impression that may be gained from the two articles and the manner in which they have been presented is that law enforcement activities targeting drugs traffickers in the region will be significantly affected by the Colombian navy’s inability now to operate in those waters affected by the dispute before the ICJ.  This, to put if very simply and starkly, is just plain nonsense.  The authors of these two articles seem to lack an adequate level of understanding of the juridical nature of the waters in question.  The legal or juridical status of the waters is as continental shelf or EEZ.  These are both resource zones whose legal significance is restricted to activities of an economic nature.

There is absolutely nothing in the law of the sea preventing the Colombian navy operating throughout this region up to, but admittedly not within, the outer limit of the Nicaraguan territorial sea (which is a mere 12 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast).    Maritime law enforcement operations are not affected by the range of rights and obligations contained in the 1982 UNCLOS, the instrument that is the formal source of both continental shelf and exclusive economic jurisdictions.  The existence of neither continental shelf nor exclusive economic jurisdictions results in rights or obligations that significantly curtail naval operational activities.  Navies do have to operate taking into account the rights of those vessels engaged in legitimate resource exploitation activities, within both jurisdictions, but the chances of navies’ obligations in this respect resulting in any serious undermining of their ability to conduct drug interdiction operations are virtually nil.  The relevant parts of 1982 UNCLOS are also now widely recognised as forming a part of the customary international law of the sea and are, therefore, binding on all States – even those that are not themselves party to the convention.  Colombia has the right to deploy its navy up to the limits of the Nicaraguan 12 nautical mile territorial sea and, in order to give meaning to that right, Nicaragua is under a correlative obligation not to prevent it doing so.  The waters above the continental shelf and forming the EEZ are, for non-economic purposes, to be regarded still as having the status of the high seas.

Closing Remarks

One of the most worrying issues within the law of the sea at present is the potential for coastal States to assume rights and to impose obligations on others that are no part of the consensus arrangements that were codified in 1982 UNCLOS.  That convention was a package deal that balanced the extension and enhancement of coastal state jurisdiction with the freedom to use the high seas for navigation and other legitimate activities.  The suggestion that navies should remove themselves from other States’ areas of continental shelf jurisdiction or EEZs serves profoundly to undermine that balance and the pattern of rights and correlative obligations that define zones of maritime jurisdiction.  Statements, such as that made by President Ortega to the effect that the Nicaraguan navy had secured the new ‘territory’ granted to Nicaragua by the ICJ, are arguably irresponsible political rhetoric; they are arguably also deserving of some measure of challenge from other States.  When respectable internationally renowned publications like The Economist fail to use the correct terminology when describing issues of this nature, there is also a need for their errors to be highlighted; if they are not they may add to the gradual spread of erroneous assumptions about vital rights and obligations at sea.

This ICJ Judgement should in no substantial manner adversely affect the way in which the Colombian navy goes about its lawful business interdicting illicit narcotics traffickers in the waters of the south-western Caribbean.  Indeed, there may even be some hope of enhanced cooperation in the region now that this dispute is legally settled.  Both Colombia and Nicaragua have clear national interest in putting an end to this traffic through their waters – and the United States also has a major interest in supporting them both.  Perhaps now that the territorial and maritime boundary dispute is resolved, a responsible diplomatic approach by the US to bring the two parties together in a spirit of cooperation will see drug interdiction improved in these waters.  In resolving the dispute, the ICJ has probably done much to stabilise and normalise relations between Nicaragua and Colombia.  In the long term, far from benefiting the drugs cartels, this Judgement may well serve to create the conditions for a further curtailing of their activities.

[1]  Professor at University of Greenwich, United Kingdom

[2]   Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgement, 19 November 2012.

[4]   See article by Associated Press ‘Colombia’s president: We will no longer recognize World Court in border disputes’ at www.todaycolombia,co/2012/11/29

[5]    ‘An islet for a sea: Colombia smarts from a loss of territorial waters’, The Economist, 8 December 2012.