LGBT Rights: Colonisation and International Human Rights Standards

Written by Garima Tiwari

While 18 countries, home to more than 10 percent of the world’s population, now recognize same-sex marriage, 77 countries still outlaw sodomy.[i]  In seven of these countries, same-sex acts are punishable by death! Just recently, the Supreme Court of India reinstated a sodomy law recriminalizing same-sex relationships in a country home to 1.2 billion people. [ii] Max Fisher says that, “That’s more than the combined populations of the next 20 most-populous countries where same-sex acts are criminalized. If we assume that rates of homosexuality are consistent worldwide, then the number of gay men and women who can be jailed for their sexuality may well have just doubled.”[iii] Continue reading

The Rohingya Revisited

Written by:  Regina Paulose

Nearly a year ago, I wrote an article outlining reasons why the ICC should take action in Myanmar (also known as Burma) in order to stop continued religious and ethnic violence towards the Rohingya. During 2013, not surprisingly, the anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar has continued.[1] In fact, violence has spread beyond targeting the Rohingya and against the larger Muslim population.[2] Although the majority displaced from the violence are still the Rohingya. Continue reading

To Kill a Man with a Joystick

Written by: Teymour Aslam

With hindsight, it appears that the horrific events of September 11th, 2001, may have triggered a paradigm shift between established geopolitical alliances, altering conventional perceptions of, and existing relations between nation states, the manner in which international relations are conducted, and perhaps most relevantly, the utilisation of unconventional military tactics in situations which are becoming increasingly difficult to classify as conventional or traditional armed conflicts under IHL.  Continue reading

Undertrials :Sentenced without Conviction

Written by Garima Tiwari

Undertrial

“The laxity with which we throw citizens into prison reflects our lack of appreciation for the tribulation of incarceration; the callousness with which we leave them there reflects our lack of deference for humanity.”[i]    -Supreme Court of India (2013)

The Supreme Court in the above case granted bail to Thana Singh who had been languishing in an Indian prison for more than 12 years, awaiting the commencement of his trial for an offence under the narcotics law.

An undertrial, or a pre-trial detainee denotes an un-convicted prisoner i.e. one who has been detained in prison during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial for the offence she/he is accused to have committed. He is an accused who is assumed to be innocent till proven guilty. He is in custody only to ensure that he appears at court as required or is available to answer questions during investigations. There is no other reason for him to be in prison Undertrials constitute 64.7% of the total prison population in India. There are over 2.41 lakh undertrial prisoners in India.[ii] An extensive investigation across the country has exposed a dark sub-culture thriving in jails across the country, not very different from the murky underworld of organised gangs and criminals. In the absence of proper legal aid, the poor and the vulnerable, especially women and youngsters, unwittingly become part of the sordid system.[iii]

Many prisoners are constrained to languish in prisons because the police do not finish investigation and file the charge-sheet in time. This is a very serious matter because such people remain in prisons without any inkling of a police case against them. Many prisoners remain in prisons for long period because of the delay in trial.

              The grant of bail[iv] is one important remedy available to reduce pre-trial detention. [v] Indian courts have reiterated that the grant of bail should be the rule rather than the exception. Because they are considered to be less likely to abscond or interfere with the investigation, bail provisions in non-bailable offences are more liberal if the accused is under sixteen, a woman, sick or infirm.[vi] Despite sounding fair, the bail provisions and their implementation are highly discriminatory. But the prisoners are unable to serve surety and as has been mentioned in the Legal Aid Committee appointed by the Government of Gujarat noted[vii]:

The bail system causes discrimination against the poor since the poor would not be able to furnish bail on account of their poverty while the wealthier persons otherwise similarly situated would be able to secure their freedom because they can afford to furnish bail.

As the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) noted, pretrial detention can therefore negatively impact the presumption of innocence,[viii] and should be used only as a “last resort.”[ix] States should only detain individuals pending trial where it is absolutely necessary. International and regional human rights instruments are explicit as to the limited circumstances under which pretrial detention is permissible. The UNHRC has stated that,

“bail should be granted, except in situations where the likelihood exists that the accused would abscond or destroy evidence, influence witnesses or flee from the jurisdiction of the state party.”[x]

In criminal proceedings, following the first appearance before a judicial officer, European Court of Human Rights Article 5(1) only permits detention when it is reasonably necessary to prevent further offenses or flight.[xi] Thus, international standards strongly encourage the imposition of noncustodial measures during investigation and trial and at sentencing, and hold that deprivation of liberty should be imposed only when non-custodial measures would not suffice.

Most of those in the Indian prisons are poor, indigent, illiterate or semi-literate. They do not know that they are entitled to free legal aid or that they can be released on personal bond. They therefore, continue to be in jail for long periods. Lack of adequate legal aid and a general lack of awareness about rights of arrestees are principal reasons for the continued detention of individuals accused of bailable offences, where bail is a matter of right and where an order of detention is supposed to be an aberration. [xii]

The overuse of detention is often a symptom of a dysfunctional criminal justice system that may lack protection for the rights of criminal defendants and the institutional capacity to impose, implement, and monitor non-custodial measures and sanctions. It is also often a cause of human rights violations and societal problems associated with an overtaxed detention system. One of the fundamental elements of human rights law which importance grew over time is the concept of “Fair Trial”. Taking this into account, the question rises how far the application of the fair trial rights stretches into the pre trial stage of investigation. Answering this question is far from easy and as Safferling points out correctly, it is by no means obvious what the fair trial concept really encompasses and what the singular rights within this concept really stand for.[xiii]

In India, apart from the Prisoners Act, 1984, there is a Model Prison Manual in place and the various judicial pronouncements have made it clear that prisoners are entitled to human rights, the most important of which is presumption of innocence till proven guilty.

In 1982-83, the All India Jail Reforms Committee under Justice A.N. Mulla came out with suggestions for prison reform. Yet to be implemented, the committee had recommended that undertrial prisoners should be lodged in separate facilities, away from convicted prisoners. It had also called for quick trials, simplification of bail procedures and suggested that bail should be granted to the accused as a matter of right unless the prosecution could prove that releasing the accused on bail endangered the security of society.[xiv]  Another suggestions is that it should be made mandatory for the jail authorities to educate them about their rights and provide them legal aid. The plight of the wrongfully confined prisoners is compounded when jail authorities refuse to release information about them in public domain. One very relevant solution is Section 436A of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code states that the maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained without being released is not more than 50% of the maximum imprisonment specified for the charge he/she is booked for, except if the offence attracts death as the maximum punishment. According to the law, such prisoners can be released on personal bond if they cannot furnish bail. This provision is hardly used by authorities. Public-spirited citizens and lawyers could also take up these matters. The prison authorities should display the updated information every month on their website and also display hard copies of the information in every prison in a place where prisoners have access.

As Justice P.N Bhagwati, “It is high time that the public conscience is awakened and the government as well as the judiciary begins to realise that in the dark cells of our prisons there are a large number of men and women who are waiting patiently, impatiently perhaps, but in vain, for justice – a commodity which is tragically beyond their reach and grasp.”[xv]

 


[i] Thana Singh v. Narcotics Bureau of Narcotics (23 January, 201)

[ii] National Crime Recorts Bureau Data 2012 (India)

[iv] The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not define the term “bail” although offences are classified as bailable and non-bailable.

[v] The main bail and bonds provisions are provided in Chapter XXXIII of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code.

[vi] Handbook of Human Rights and Criminal Justice in India, by South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2007, p. 62.

[vii]Report of the Legal Aid Committee appointed by the Government of Gujarat, 1971 (headed by Justice P.N. Bhagwati) (p. 185)

[viii] Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Argentina, CCPR/CO/70/ARG (2000), para. 10.

[ix] United Nations Minimum Rules of Non-Custodial Measures, Principle 6.1

[x]  Hill v. Spain, Communication No. 526/1993, para. 12.3.

[xi] Council of Europe, Recommendation (2006)13 on the Use of Remand in Custody, the Conditions in which it takes place and the Provision of Safeguards against Abuse, para. 6.

[xiii] SAFFERLING,CHRISTOPH J. Towards an International Criminal Procedure, Oxford 2001 p.26

[xv] Hussainara Khatoon and Others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1360.

Victim Rights: Are We Victimising the Perpetrators?

Victims have rights. No doubt about it. Since the 1960’s the need for the criminal justice system to take into account the needs of the victims has been emphasized. These efforts-mostly driven by non profits-have borne fruits. The international community has paid attention. In 1985 the United Nations Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power was adopted by the General Assembly[1]. This Declaration recognized the vulnerability of victims of crime and that there was a need for judicial and administrative processes to respond better. Part of the better response included “allowing the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings where their personal interests are affected, without prejudice to the accused and consistent with the relevant national criminal justice system”[2]. In almost similar fashion, the General Assembly subsequently adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law[3]. This instrument provided, inter alia that “A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law or of a serious violation of international humanitarian law shall have equal access to an effective judicial remedy as provided for under international law”[4].

The right of victims to actively participate in the criminal trial process has also been reflected in international criminal law. Thus, whereas previous international tribunals such as the Nuremburg Tribunals, the ICTR, the ICTY among others, did not offer any role to the victim during the trial, the Rome Statute has been very generous in this regard. The Statute sets up a Victim and Witnesses Unit within the Registry charged with the responsibility of undertaking “protective measures and security arrangements, counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses”[5]. In addition, Article 68 provides that ‘‘Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court”[6]. The only qualification to this right is that it ought to be conducted “in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial”[7]. The ICC has had occasion to interpret this rather wide provision. In the Lubanga case[8], for example, the victims were allowed to directly participate in the investigations and the prosecution of the case. In the Kenyatta case[9] and the William Ruto case[10], victim participation during the trial process included allowing the Victim’s Representative to ask questions during the trial.

Whereas this development in the recognition of the victim rights is applaudable, I am concerned that the international criminal jurisprudence could end up tipping to the other side: ‘victimising’ the alleged perpetrator in the name of recognizing the victim(s)’ rights. Let me explain. The entire adversarial nature of criminal trials hangs on an assumption of the equality of arms between the protagonists. The prosecution and the accused person should have equal resources and the same opportunities to argue their cases. However, this balance will be interfered with when the Victim is provided an opportunity to participate in the trial. Since the victim would naturally be on the opposing side from the accused person, his/her participation would essentially be a second cross examination of the accused person and his witnesses. An unfair result no doubt.

Secondly, victim participation in proceedings negatively affects the pace of proceedings. This also has negative repercussions on the rights of the accused to have his case determined fast. The Victim will not only spend time during the cross examination stage but he will also have a right to make interlocutory applications and appeal on any Rulings therefrom. This could in turn take an inordinate amount of the court’s time. As an example, Elisabeth Baumgartner estimates that in the Lubanga case “out of a total of 45decisions rendered by Pre-Trial Chamber I from the issuing of the warrant of arrest in February 2006 tothe referral of the case to the Trial Chamber in September 2007, 20 decisions (13 per cent of all decisions) were directly related to victim participation (not counting decisions on victim protection issues)”[11]. In a court where each second counts in terms of the cost implications, this is significant.

Thirdly, the primary role of the criminal justice process is to determine the guilt or otherwise of the accused person. In other words, “the criminal law system cannot serve therapeutic purposes, since it does not have the resources needed and was not designed to attend to the victims.”[12] All other roles such as victim support are ancillary and ought to be in support of this objective. The participation or none participation of a victim at this stage does not affect the guilt or otherwise of the accused person[13]. Admittedly the court needs to understand the pain and circumstances of the victim as a result of the alleged crimes. However, such information is only relevant at the sentencing stage, not in trial. When the victim participates at the hearing stage the smooth functioning and possibly the eyes of the court are taken away from the primary goal (guilt or innocence of the accused) to ancillary issues (plight of the victims

Lastly, the victims interests in court are (or ought to) be adequately represented by the Office of the Prosecutor. Limiting the participation of the victims during the trial will compel them to co-operate more with the Office of the Prosecution. Rather than pursuing their own independent strategy, the victims will work with the objective of the prosecutor. This is a good thing for international criminal law.

In a word therefore for the above mentioned reasons there is need to rethink the participation of the victims   in the trial process. Too great an involvement is not only disruptive but “might not be the most judicious path towards the recovery and reparation desired by the victim”[14].


[1] Resolution No. A/RES/40/34,29 November 1985, 96th plenary meeting

[2] Annex to the Resolution, Access to Justice and Fair Treatment, Paragraph No. 6(b)

[3] Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005

[4] Annex to the Resolution, Access to Justice, Paragraph 12

[5] Article 43 Paragraph 6

[6] Paragraph 3

[7] Ibid

[8] ICC, Decision on the applications for participation in the proceedings of VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 in the Case Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-172, 29 June 2006

[9] ICC-01/09-02/11 The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali

[10] ICC-01/09-01/11 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang

[11] Aspects of victim participation in the proceedings of the International Criminal Court by Elisabeth Baumgartner, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 90 Number 870 June 2008, Footnote No 39

[12] Victims and International Criminal Justice: A Vexed Question? by Mina Rauschenbach and Damien Scalia, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 90 Number 870, June 2008.umber 870 June 2008Volume 90 Number 870 June 2008

[13] Of course, the limitation to this is when the victim testifies in court as a witness for the prosecution

[14] Supra Note 12