Category Archives: Human Rights

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February 8, 2013

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Human Rights, IHL, Law of War, Terrorism

Targeted Killings and Humanitarian Law

WRITTEN BY: DR. BONNIE C. BRENNAN[1]

The relationship between human rights and humanitarian law grows ever more complicated.  The current view is that human rights applies at all times everywhere and that humanitarian law is lex specialis, applying only in time of war in the theatre of war with the possible exception of belligerent occupation.[2] The question I would like to raise in this brief essay is which law properly applies to the targeted killings currently being undertaken by the Obama administration against suspected terrorists.

What is War?

The problem with the selection of the applicable law lies in defining the term “war.”[3]  Certainly, at the time that the Geneva Conventions[4] were written, shortly after the close of World War II, the answer as to what constituted “war” must have seemed self-evident.  Indeed, the 1949 Geneva Conventions were written with an eye to World War II and were intended to outlaw the excesses of that war.  One might argue that the excesses of that war were outlawed again as previous humanitarian law conventions were ignored by the belligerents during World War II.  As a product of the developments in technology that had taken place since World War I, especially in connection with airpower, the principle of distinction was simply disregarded. Both the Allies and the Axis powers engaged in the unlimited bombing of civilian populations with the intent to weaken their resolve to fight; hence, World War II tragically devolved into total war — and, of course, total destruction.[5]

It has often been noted that generals tend to prepare for the last war.  Apparently international lawyers are guilty of the same error in judgment.   In the shadow of the so-called Cold War, however, an outbreak of conventional warfare on the scale of the two world wars was impossible.  The two superpowers avoided direct confrontation with each other, especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis.  It is fair to say that the leadership on both sides did not merely scare each other, but also themselves, with the nuclear brinkmanship associated with that crisis.

As a result, there were no more conventional wars the consequences of which the 1949 Geneva Conventions were written to ameliorate.  Rather, both superpowers engaged in war by proxy around the world.  Internal wars, spurred by superpower meddling, became the norm as was evinced by the negotiation of Additional Protocol II of 1977.[6]  At or about that time, however, another form of violence had become prominent, that is, international terrorism which was perpetrated by a broad range of groups during the seventies including the IRA, the PLO, Beider Meinhof, the Red Brigades, FLQ and SLA.

Terrorism is, of course, effective because, like total war, it does not respect the principle of distinction.  But is it war and should it be addressed by humanitarian law?  Or is the international human rights regime the relevant law?  Or should an entirely different legal regime be developed with international terrorism solely in mind?

The Global War on Islam

This is hardly a new question, but it is becoming an increasingly urgent question.  It is old news that, after the attack on the World Trade Center, the Bush administration declared a Global War on Terror.  Despite repeated claims to the contrary, it is clear that it evolved into a Global War on Islam.

Should you doubt this, contrast the treatment of Timothy McVeigh, a Christian and a U.S. citizen, who detonated a truck bomb in front of the federal building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, killing 168 people and injuring over 800 in an act of revenge for Waco and Ruby Ridge with the treatment of Anwar al-Awlaki, a Muslim and also a U.S. citizen, who openly advocated Jihadism and who was the spiritual advisor to individuals who perpetrated terrorist acts including the shootings at Fort Hood in 2009 and attempted terrorist acts including the so-called Christmas Day bombing in the same year.   While both were ultimately executed, McVeigh first received a full and fair trial which observed the entire panoply of Constitutional rights.[7]  Anwar al-Awlaki, who may have preached violence but killed no one, was summarily executed by means of a drone attack in Yemen on September 30, 2011.[8]  Moreover, two weeks later, his 16-year-old son, also a U.S. citizen, was killed in a second drone strike, also in Yemen.[9]

Plainly, both the United States and its European allies have securitized their relationship with their Muslim minorities.  Other states around the world have jumped onto the bandwagon, seizing upon the opportunity to declare their own troublesome Muslim minorities “terrorists,”  including the Chechens so-designated by Russia and the Uyghurs so-designated by China — this despite the obvious fact that both states were guilty of repressing these minorities, thus inviting armed resistance.

Within the United States we have seen the rise of a second rate McCarthy in the guise of Congressman Peter King, who has held extensive hearings on the prevention of the radicalization of American Muslims.[10]  It is an approach that is guaranteed to result in the very outcome King purports to wish to prevent.  Plainly, American Muslims have not failed to note that they are viewed as enemies of the state by virtue of their religion and their religion alone.

Witnessing the characterization of Muslims as the enemy based solely on their religious beliefs — in open violation of our first amendment guarantees — is deeply disturbing and there appears to be no end in sight.  Anti-Muslim propaganda appears to issue from every quarter.  The current administration, which billed itself as a human rights administration during its first run for office, made campaign promises to close GITMO, try the prisoners held there and/or set them free.[11]  There was substantial, and I would say ill-considered resistance to rendering justice on behalf of these men.  Moreover, as events have evolved, it is not at all clear that the resistance originated entirely outside of the administration.[12]

President Obama, in reference to the fact that his daughters will soon be dating, has felt at liberty to joke about ensuring their future dates’ good behavior by threatening them with drones.[13]  Putting aside a father’s archaic desire to guard his daughters’ virtue, I am in any event ill at ease with the joke.  This administration has foresworn torture in favor of the use of drones for the purposes of summary execution of suspected terrorists around the world, including American citizens.  The collateral damage has, moreover, been substantial.  It is not at all clear to me how this is an improvement over the previous administration’s international legal record whether we deem the appropriate law to be human rights or humanitarian law.  Surely death by summary execution is not better than torture and surely both are reprehensible uses of force.

Choosing the Right Law 

Plainly, the United States is permitted to prevent further terrorist attacks.  So once again I must ask, which is the appropriate law?  Is it human rights law, which would only provide for the capture and prosecution of terrorists?  Or is it humanitarian law, which permits the use of force only against legitimate military targets during time of war?  On a human rights theory, the United States is under an obligation to attempt to take the perpetrators into custody and provide them with a full and fair trial consistent with our constitution.  There are only limited circumstances under which criminal law would permit the U.S. government to kill a suspected criminal rather then capturing him or her alive and all of them involve the protection of the state and its citizens against the immediate threat of violence.

However, the present administration is obviously not disposed to proceed in a manner consistent with the human rights model.  Nothing made that fact clearer than the execution of Osama bin Laden.  Despite claims to the contrary, it is absurd to suppose that a highly elite Navy SEALs unit was incapable of capturing bin Laden alive and returning him to the United States to be prosecuted.[14]  Videos of bin Laden that emerged after his death showed a frightened old man who had hidden in a Pakistani compound for years to avoid capture.[15]  They underscored how vulnerable to attack he really was.  Moreover, there was plenty of evidence including archival film footage to establish that, while he may have been the face of international Jihadi terrorism, he was himself incapable of so much as properly handling a gun.[16]  It should have been obvious to an objective observer that he posed no threat to the members of the SEALs unit.  Whatever reasons may be offered, the plain truth was that the American military was sent to Pakistan to execute, not capture, the then weak old man.

The summary execution of suspected terrorists is clearly the preference of the current administration.  In contrast to the capture of the bulk of the Nazi leadership (sans Hitler, who committed suicide)  and their prosecution at Nuremberg in accordance with the rule of law, persons who notably killed not thousands but millions of unarmed civilians during World War II, there has been no attempt to bring alleged terrorists to justice after 9/11.   Hence, the summary executions continue apace.

Can a serious argument be made that humanitarian law applies?  I believe that it is a hard argument to make.  None of the hallmarks of war are here apparent.  Certainly, terrorists have political motivations.  But this fact is hardly sufficient to convert loosely organized groups into armies waging war.  The current administration acknowledges that the structural integrity of al-Qaeda has largely been undermined.[17]  While it is not clear to me that it was ever the highly organized, monolithic group that the last administration represented it to be, it is certainly not that anymore.

In any event, for humanitarian law to apply, the claim must be that terrorists can properly be targeted with force by the United States military by virtue of their status as enemy soldiers.  I would suggest that that claim is, on its face, a poor fit with the requirements of humanitarian law.  Indeed, every account of how humanitarian law justifies targeted killings that I have so far encountered assumes that summary executions of suspected terrorists are legitimate and then attempts to make this square peg fit into an unquestionably round hole.

We know that Additional Protocol II was written with nonstate actors in mind.  Article 1, entitled “Material field of application,” provides in paragraph 1 that the Protocol is intended to supplement Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in connection with armed conflicts “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.”  Common Article 3 similarly provides that it applies to “armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”  Plainly, the remainder of humanitarian law, whether originating with the Hague or Geneva Conventions, has no application here as they are only relevant to interstate conflicts.[18]

One can make the argument that international terrorism, while by definition crossing international borders, nonetheless occurs in the territory of the State Party where the terrorist attack occurs.  One could further argue that at least some terrorist groups possess a sufficiently well established command structure to comprise an organized armed group.  International terrorists do not, however, “exercise such control over a part of [a State Party’s] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations” nor indeed does that appear to be their objective.

Plainly, neither Additional Protocol II nor Common Article 3 have application to international terrorism.  Indeed, the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol II would appear, by its terms, to exclude international terrorism.  It states that the protocol “shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.”[19]  Where international terrorism preexisted the negotiation and adoption of Additional Protocol II, its drafters could have explicitly included it if they were so disposed.  All of the evidence suggests that they had no intention of including terrorism within its coverage.

Advocates of the application of humanitarian law to international terrorism bemoan the fact that the failure to designate terrorists as legitimate military targets gives terrorists the upper hand.  I can only say welcome to the world of law enforcement.  Yet we require all police agencies of the United States to observe the requirements of our law, including the Constitution of the United States of America to which they have sworn their allegiance.

The Third Choice

There is, of course, a third alternative and that is to develop a new body of law intended exclusively to address the question of terrorism.  It would not be odd to suggest that there are lacunae in international law, including the law of war.  Spies, for instance, are intimately involved in the prosecution of war.  The gathering of reliable intelligence is essential to the identification of military targets and the minimization of collateral damage.  Yet, even recognizing this fact, the law addressing the activities of spies and their treatment upon capture is admittedly underdeveloped.[20]

The United Nations has long tried to develop law treating the question of terrorism, to date with little success.[21]  The problem is always and invariably the same:  One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.  This is not a position without merit even from an American point of view.  There can be little doubt that the British colonial administration would have deemed members of the American militias during our War of Independence to be terrorists were the concept available to them at the time.  International law has undergone extensive development since the American Revolution, however, and compelling politically motivated terrorists/freedom fighters to observe the principle of distinction would be a boon to the international community.

In the absence of a fully developed legal regime specifically treating terrorism, however, the default principle must prevail.  If an individual is not a soldier, then he or she is by definition a civilian.  As a civilian, he or she is not a legitimate target of military force.  The summary execution of a civilian is not consistent with either humanitarian law or the law of human rights.  We, the United States, its law enforcement agencies and its armed forces, are under an obligation to capture suspected terrorists and bring them to justice.  Targeted killing is simply insupportable under the law as it currently exists.

Conclusion

I have no love of terrorists.  I lived in New York City when the planes struck the World Trade Center – that symbol of American global economic dominance.  My mother lived only a short distance from the Pentagon when the planes struck that most prominent symbol of American military might.  I feared to discover if anyone I knew died in either place.  I have yet to recover from the images of individuals, who knowing that they were about to die, were left with the singular choice as to how.  I still cannot bear to reflect on their fall from the heights of the World Trade Center to their deaths while horrified New Yorkers helplessly looked on.  In sum, I have no confusion about why they call it terrorism, as I was indeed terrified.

But while I have no love of terrorism, I do love the law and I cannot permit the tortured interpretations to which it has been subject since 9/11 to pass without comment.  As a state that everywhere promotes the rule of law, we must act consistently with the law or be deemed utterly without credibility.  It is time for us to cease and desist from the practice of targeted killings.  It is time for us to do what is right because it is the right thing to do.

[1]   Bonnie C. Brennan received her J.D. from the NYU School of Law and her Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.  She currently teaches human rights and humanitarian law at the NYU Department of Politics and practices criminal defense law at The Legal Aid Society in New York City.

[2]   See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ¶ 106, ICJ Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[3]   The term of art is, of course, “armed conflict,” a term which the Geneva Conventions do not themselves define. For a ICRC commentary on the meaning of “armed conflict,” see http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[4] See 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols (text and commentaries), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[5]  For a discussion of “strategic” or “area”  bombing, see Stephen A. Garrett, Ethics and Airpower in World War II  (1997).

[6]   Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/475?OpenDocument (Accessed on February 7, 2012).

[7]  See Gore Vidal, “The Meaning of Timothy McVeigh,” Vanity Fair (September 2001), http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2001/09/mcveigh200109 (Accessed on February 7, 2013), for a discussion of the man and his motivations.

[8] Ahmed Al Haj, “Ahmed Al-Haj, “Anwar Al-Awlaki Dead: U.S.-Born Al Qaeda Cleric Killed In Yemen,” October 10, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/30/anwar-alawlaki-usborn-mus_n_988397.html (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[9]  Peter Finn and Greg Miller, “Anwar Al-Awlaki’s family speaks out against his son’s death in airstrike,” Washington Post, October 17, 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-10-17/world/ 35279713_1_anwar-al-awlaki-ibrahim-al-banna-aqap (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[10]  Chris Lisee, “Rep. Peter King’s Muslim ‘Radicalization’ Hearings Return to Capitol,” June 21, 2012,  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/21/peter-king-muslim-radicalization-hearings_n_1613746. html (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[11]  ACLU, “Close Guantanamo,” undated,  http://www.aclu.org/close-guantanamo (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[12] Charlie Savage, “Closing Guantanamo Fades as a Priority,” New York Times,  June 25, 2010,  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/26/us/politics/26gitmo.html?_r=0 (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[13]  Kristina Wong, “President Obama’s Joke About Predator Drones Draws Fire,” ABC News, May  3, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/05/president-obamas-joke-about-predator-drones-draws-fire/ (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[14]  See Nicholas Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden,” The New Yorker, August 8, 2011,  http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle?currentPage=all (Accessed on February 7, 2013) for a popular account of Bin Laden’s death.

[15]  Martha Raddatz & Luis Martinez, “Osama Bin Laden Videos Released by Government,” May 8, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/osama-bin-laden-home-videos-released-pentagon/story?id=13552384 (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[16] “Osama Bin Laden Shoots Guns,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Cg2s3amG50 (Accessed on February 7, 2013), shows the propagandistic version of the video.  However, although I can find it no where on the Internet, there were airings of the same video on television which showed an inept bin Laden fumbling with the gun before and after the cut of him apparently firing it.

[17] James Gordon Meek, “Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda a shell of its former strength; Yemeni group now biggest threat: report,” NY Daily News, February 8, 2011, http://www. nydailynews.com/ news/national/ osama-bin-laden-al-qaeda-shell-strength-yemeni-group-biggest-threat-report-article-1.135402#ixzz2KGil0d5S (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[18] See 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols (text and commentaries), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView  (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[19]   Id.

[20] Michael Bothe, “Combatants and Noncombatants,” in Dieter Fleck, ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, 65, 98 (1999),  http://books.google.com/books  (Accessed on February 7, 2013).

[21]  Sixth Committee, Sixty-seventh General Assembly, 1st & 2nd Meetings (AM & PM), “Legal Committee Urges Conclusion of Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism:  Delegates Urge Clear Definition to Distinguish Terrorist Acts from Right of Self-determination,” UN Doc. GA/L/3433, 8 October 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 2012/gal3433.doc.htm (Accessed on February 7, 2013). See also International Instruments Related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism, (2008), UN Sales No. E.08.V.2, http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/ Publications/Int_Instruments_Prevention_and_Suppression_Int_Terrorism/Publication_-_English_-_08-25503_text.pdf (Accessed on February 7, 2013), for a compilation of the piecemeal approach to the regulation of international terrorism so far achieved by the international community.

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January 15, 2013

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Human Rights, International Tribunal, Special Court for Sierra Leone, STL, Terrorism

Why it may be time for Truth and Reconciliation for the STL and Lebanon

WRITTEN BY: SEVANE TADEVOSSIAN[1]

In this post I explore the question of whether the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) could benefit from the establishment of a Lebanese Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The establishment of a TRC may be particular useful with regards to its (1) legitimacy, (2) outreach, and (3) rule of law.  To understand the very mixed and complex cultural background where a new tribunal is trying to settle in, it is crucial to have an understanding of the specificity of Lebanon. Indeed, the country has suffered a violent civil war which started in 1975 and lasted more than ten years. Lebanon was occupied by Syria starting in 1982, and Syrian troops were finally withdrawn in 2006, following UN Resolution 1559. However, Syria kept powerful influences in Lebanon through the Hezbollah, a Shia party.[2] There is a multitude of religious groups linked to political parties in Lebanon, the main ones being the Sunni Muslims, the Shia Muslims, the Maronite Christians, the Greek Orthodox, the Druze, and so forth.[3] It is in such a fragile and diverse context that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is trying to bring justice and stability to the country.

On 14 February 2005, a suicide car bomb killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others persons. In response, the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) created on 7 April 2005 the International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) to investigate this terrorist attack. Following these investigations, the UN, in cooperation with the Lebanese government, decided to sign an agreement (the Agreement[4]) to create a Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The latter has a mandate to indict the perpetrators of the 14 February 2005 attack, as well as the perpetrators of eventual subsequent attacks as long as they would be linked to the first attack and would resemble it in terms of its methods and motives. Unfortunately, political killings are very common in Lebanon, thus increasing expectations that the STL finally will help with the peace restoration within the country.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is the last tribunal to have entered the world of international criminal justice. It differs from other similar instances due to its uniqueness, both because of its structure and its mode of functioning. However, the existence of the STL is hotly disputed because of its partial inactivity five years after its entry into force, and especially because of its very poor reception by the Lebanese population.

Legitimacy

One of the main issues of the STL is the debate on why it was established, i.e. questions regarding its legitimacy, as some critics have justifiably stated that the STL is the incarnation of selective justice in the sense that it is only created to find truth and justice for a Prime Minister. Where the STL’s legitimacy, and de facto credibility, is most exposed within the Lebanese population itself and this fact contributes to hindering national reconciliation. Undeniably, the STL divides the population into two camps: for and against the STL.[5] Sunnis and Christians, who form the “March 14 movement,” support the STL, placing high hopes in it to fight against impunity and finally see an end to political assassinations in Lebanon.[6] For both the Sunnis and the Christians, the STL has a symbolic value. On the contrary, the “March 8 coalition,” consisting of the Shia parties Amal and Hezbollah, vehemently oppose the existence of the STL because they suspect it of being an instrument of foreign political powers.[7] Thus, the STL is facing many challenges to its general acceptance by the Lebanese population, particularly owing to the local perceptions from a historical and political context tinged with a long recent civil war.[8] Its legitimacy is flawed, as notes Sheikh Mohamed Hussein Fadlallah:

“How can this tribunal achieve legal results and establish judicial rights when it is rejected by a large segment of the Lebanese population and by Syria? How can its resolution be implemented without creating tension? When we see that the states pushing most for this tribunal are the US, the UK and France, the big question is whether their aim is really to bring the truth or to introduce their interests in the region through it?”[9]

Therefore, I believe it is fundamental for the STL to clearly face the fears and allegations of its critics, first, in order to be able to carry out its mandate thoroughly, and second (if not above all), to calm the tensions it has created within the Lebanese population. Indeed, I think that beyond its mandate, is it also the STL’s duty to bring peace to Lebanon as the mandate of the STL is basically an order to establish justice and peace, albeit limited to the Hariri case but implicitly to the rest of the country as well, knowing the implications of the Hariri case.[10] Besides, the Security Council (SC) established the STL at Lebanon’s request. Therefore, it means that the Lebanese government is searching for specific goals within the convention signed with the SC. Indeed, the SC granted the Lebanese government’s wishes by agreeing to a convention, but the true desire of the government was not only tied to the Hariri case: it was a national plan to find justice. And there is no need to look too deeply into the matter to come to the conclusion that it was made with a view to bring violence and impunity to a halt in order to finally achieve peace and security (the involvement of the SC under Chapter VII of the Charter makes it even more obvious).

At the end, the true issue comes down to ownership. Only the feeling of ownership of the STL by the Lebanese population will establish its much desired acceptance, legitimacy, and credibility. As one scholar stated, “the question of ownership of the tribunal is the decisive question. First and foremost, such a tribunal has value only to the degree in which societies see it as an essential component to clarify past crimes and to rebuild trust in the institutions and improve the rule of law. This being said, the work of a criminal tribunal – even when it is highly successful – is a long process. Nuremberg trials have been perceived from 1946 to the mid-sixties at being a tribunal of victors. It has taken a generation in order that the legacy of the Nuremberg trials became part of the German ethos. To believe that the Hariri Tribunal will be a quick fix to create a common narrative among Lebanese would be a major mistake.”[11]

It tastes bitter to admit that these comments made in 2007 turned out to be true and continues to be so to this day.

Outreach

Outreach is widely connected to legitimacy. Indeed, without a good outreach policy, no explanation can be given concerning legitimacy or further concerns, thus keeping the STL misunderstood. But from this misunderstanding also stems the lack of credibility, the possibility of political manipulations, and so forth. Therefore, it is completely in the STL’s interest to develop outreach towards the Lebanese population, and to be at service for any questions or concerns the Lebanese might have, as at the end of the day, the STL was established to bring justice, peace and stability to the country. And no peace and stability can be maintained in Lebanon if its own population has serious reservations and legitimate doubts about the most important symbol of justice in the country. Even if the STL has developed a strong social media network and its representatives have tried to integrate an international response to its issues, it seems like all these efforts are not enough to justify and convince the Lebanese population on its results, and most importantly on its future existence. Lebanon can get inspired by the process in Sierra Leone where their TRC launched a “sensitization phase” of its program and work in 2002. Again, there is plenty of room for improvement of the STL’s outreach.

Legal culture against impunity: gaining respect for the rule of law

The STL could benefit a great deal from a Lebanese TRC. If a tribunal, i.e. the STL in our case, is the place where the rule of law is to be respected and implemented, it may not have an impact outside of the tribunal. Indeed, resulting from the meager outreach work of the STL, the lessons learned and the principles and values defended in the tribunal may not always be available for the other legal practitioners, let alone the population. It would be very useful and helpful for the Lebanese to set up an institution that would aide them on the workings of the STL, in terms of both its strengths and weaknesses: learn from its mistakes, construct from its successes. In my opinion, the Lebanese rule of law as well as Lebanese themselves would have a lot to gain from such a mechanism: a place where information and updates would be shared, and legal strategies could be discussed; a place where the STL jurists could exchange views with Lebanese jurists, the nationals learning from the internationals, and vice-versa. Indeed, it is not only up to the international jurists to train the local jurists, but maybe to even greater benefit the domestic Lebanese jurists could explain to the internationalized branch of the STL (the STL being a “hybrid” tribunal, i.e. a mix of local and international staff) the local legal culture and norms.

But in case of such an institution never seeing the light of day… could it be possible that local jurists as well as the Lebanese population both simultaneously and mutually strengthen respect for the rule of law via a TRC? If so, this would be a revival of the Lebanese will to fight against injustice. A TRC could be the perfect place where the STL would extend its work outside the persons concerned by its mandate, hence my belief that a TRC could be an interesting tool for the STL and the Lebanese situation as a whole.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone and its TRC

The TRC in Sierra Leone was established on July 7 1999, after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement (1999). The TRC “has been established through an act of Parliament by the government of Sierra Leone, [but it] will be an independent body. The commission was later enacted in 2000 by the President and Parliament.”[12] The TRC in Sierra Leone has two main goals: to investigate the violations, and to restore human dignity to the victims. Its specific mandate is the following: “to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.”[13]

Vargas states that “it is clear that the TRC is not a judicial body; however, since there is a Special Court for bringing to justice those who were the most responsible of violations during the war, the TRC can focus then in a catharsis to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past and not necessarily in finding who the guilty are. The TRC is a fact finding body but with the additional responsibility of setting up a follow-up process to put the country together once more.”[14]

The Moroccan TRC

The Moroccan TRC, called the Instance Equité et Réconciliation (IER), was created on 7 January 2004 by King Mohamed VI to investigate human rights violations such as disappearances and arbitrary detentions that took place between 1956 and 1999 in Morocco. Besides bringing justice to the victims of these violations, part of its mandate is to produce a report on these violations and to suggest various forms of compensations and reparations to the victims. King Mohamed VI further asked the IER to formulate recommendations to help Morocco in preventing the repetition of such crimes.[15] However, some criticism was leveled since grave human rights violations such as torture were not in the TRC mandate. Such criticism is what the STL is currently experiencing on its selective mandate.[16]

Building Bridges Between Mechanisms

Building bridges by making links between mechanisms that have worked and the possibility of creating a TRC is where such a realization might be judged as realistic or not. It could be achieved by relying on concrete measures, tying theory to practice with some guidelines to follow and guarding against repeating mistakes using previous experiences.

Sierra Leone did not refrain from establishing a TRC despite the existence of a special court. Even if it meant that more money was to be spent in the judicial field and that some sectors would lack funding, the government chose to implement a second institution for the quest of truth and justice. No doubt, Sierra Leone was acutely aware that the prolonged division within the population and the feeling of fear, frustration and injustice would bring nothing positive to its future. For Sierra Leone, the resolution of the conflict had no cost. In the end, it is after all a matter of priorities, of which choices to make. I think that Sierra Leone did choose correctly. Lebanon should, for its own sake, take inspiration from Sierra Leone and not be stopped by the existence of the STL. Indeed, judicial apparel was established in Lebanon. However, when it comes to its efficiency, criticisms are being made. Hence the urgency to find some solutions and suggest a complement to its work.

Then, why not base the Lebanese example on the Sierra Leone case? After all, they both have special courts and Sierra Leone still established a TRC despite the existence of a tribunal similar to the STL. Vargas claims that both institutions, i.e. the SCSL and the TRC,   “were created to address, in their own particular way, the same events, and are functioning at the same time. At the end, what it is meant is to answer if this transition process can lead to both: peace and justice.”[17] In addition, Lebanon can get inspired by the process in Sierra Leone where the TRC launched a “sensitization phase” of its program and work in 2002. Again, there is plenty of room for improvement of the STL’s outreach.

Each situation is unique and different. Therefore, I think that it is essential to first identify the challenges and issues, and then proceed with the best solutions fitting this and only this situation. The application of an ICT everywhere is not the answer, and the Lebanese example is the proof. It is important to include the work of not only psychologists, but sociologists and political scientists (in order to understand the sensitive issues in the region) to have a holistic approach and a vision as a whole. Indeed, if only jurists are involved in a process as huge as peace-building and reconciliation, no wonder the system is not working, as law and justice represent a part of the process. Maybe the most vivid example of such a mistake was in Iraq.[18]

CONCLUSION

There are quite a few unsolved issues with regards to the STL in Lebanon. Impunity and justice are still ongoing every day that passes by in which nothing is done to put a halt to them. It seems that Lebanon itself is unable to cure its own wounds, but this country managed to put its ego to one side and bluntly reached out to the international community for help. Thus, it is now the international community’s duty to provide relief in solidarity to the Lebanese population. The Lebanese population plays such a central role in the weight given to any political decision that this is why focus has to be made on the outreach of the STL. The STL needs the population’s support in order to fully complete its mandate. Therefore, its acceptance by the Lebanese is key.

Also, it is essential to keep in mind that the consequences of this tribunal are not limited merely to the legal field, but also apply to every aspect of Lebanese life. Indeed, if there is so much controversy around the STL, it is not because jurists are debating it all over the world. It is because its symbol has repercussions and meaning for everyone, not only in Lebanon, but also beyond Lebanese borders. It instills fear because it is the living proof that justice can be enforced by the SC in any situation, even for only one death. And then looms another fear: what kind of justice is that? Such darkness and misunderstanding generate violent reactions and understandable concerns. It is now up to the STL to face these fears, and I propose that it does so through its outreach and, why not, through a coordinated TRC? However, a TRC may not be the most appropriate option, and therefore further analysis of other forms of mechanisms is needed. No matter what form that mechanism would take, the key word is ownership, as without it any type of institution will fail in its task to make the population connect with the tribunal.

There is something more to be done in Lebanon. For the reasons exposed throughout this research paper, I think the establishment of a TRC that would complement and support the STL’s work is a viable idea. Hence, this eventuality could be explored by experts of transitional justice. To anticipate the Lebanese expectations and reactions, a referendum among the population could serve as a barometer of the reception of such an idea. Now is the time to put into full action the machinery of justice and to put all the chances on the tribunal’s side for the STL to work efficiently. As the former Prosecutor of the ICC Luis Moreno Ocampo states, “silence has never helped or protected victims. Silence only helps the criminals.”[19] Therefore, it is about time that the STL’s silence on the suffering of the Lebanese population ceases, and that finally a mechanism such as a TRC echoes the unheard victims’ voices.

[1] The author is a graduate of the UNICRI 2012, LLM program in International Crime and Justice. You can email the author for more information: sevane.tadevossian@gmail.com

[2] Corm, Georges, “Le Liban contemporain, Histoire et société”, p.302

[3] Corm, Georges, “Le Liban contemporain, Histoire et société”, p.27

[4] The Agreement between the UN and the government of Lebanon for the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (in the « Annex » section of this paper)

[5] See interview with Fatima Sara, Elias Mirza and O. and Iloubnan.com, « Le Tribunal Spécial, un instrument pour susciter les tensions à l’intérieur du Liban », posted on http://www.iloubnan.info/politique/interview/id/48016/titre/Le-Tribunal-sp%C3%A9cial,-un-instrument-pour-susciter-les-tensions-%C3%A0-l-int%C3%A9rieur-du-Liban

[6] See interview with O. and Wierda, M., Nassar, H., Maalouf, L., “Early Reflections on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon” in Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp.1066

[8] See Corm, Georges, « Le Liban contemporain, Histoire et société » et « L’Europe et l’Orient, De la balkanisation à la libanisation, Histoire d’une modernité inaccomplie »

[9] Wierda, M., Nassar, H., Maalouf, L., “Early Reflections on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon” in Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp.1074

[10] See “Extracts” §2

[11] Hazan, Pierre, “Truth-Seeking and Justice in Lebanon and its Repercussion on the Conflict” in Expert Paper “Workshop 9 – Justice Mechanisms and the Question of Legitimacy: Concepts and Challenges”, p.5

[12] Vargas Juarez, Raúl, “The relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone : issues of transitional justice”, p.23; see also Romano, Cesare P.R., Nollkaemper André, Kleffner Jann K., “Internationalized criminal courts and tribunals : Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia”

[13] Truth and Reconciliation Act (2000), section 2 (b)

[14] Vargas Juarez, Raúl, “The relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone : issues of transitional justice”, p.25

[15] Human Rights Watch, “La commission marocaine de vérité : Le devoir de mémoire honoré à une époque incertaine”, p.2

[16] See section  « A mandate of selective justice » of this research paper, p.9

[17] Vargas Juarez, Raúl, “The relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone : issues of transitional justice”, p.2

[18] Hazan, Pierre, « La paix contre la justice ? », p.124

[19] DVD “The Reckoning, the Battle for the International Criminal Court” de Pamela Yates (2009)

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January 6, 2013

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Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights, International Criminal Court, Rome Statute, Security Council, War Crimes

The ICC: Protection for the Rohingya?

Written by: Regina Paulose

In November 2012, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC released its Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012, which examines situations in various countries for acts which could potentially amount to crimes against humanity and/or war crimes. Some of the countries mentioned in this report are North Korea, Columbia, and Afghanistan.[1] While one could question some of the cases the OTP is currently investigating,[2] this author takes the position that there are other atrocious human rights situations which need the immediate attention of the ICC.  In particular, the OTP should begin to make efforts to investigate and address the continued persecution and abuse of the Rohingya population in Burma.[3]

The Status Quo Conflict and Response

According to some scholars, the Rohingya’s origins are not entirely clear.[4] Setting aside this debate, the Rohingya mainly reside in Burma on the western side. The Rohingya are a Muslim minority in Burma where the majority of the population is Buddhist. It is estimated that there are currently 800,000 to 1 million Rohingya living in Burma. Since the 1970’s the regime in Burma has been trying to drive out or restrict the Rohingya.[5] This sentiment was put into law in 1982 when it created a Citizenship Law, which mandates that a person must prove their Burmese ancestry dating back to 1823 in order to have freedom of movement and access to other basic rights such as education in the country.[6] (Recall: Armenian Genocide and Nazi Germany). This law is one of the prime reasons why the Rohingya have become “stateless.”

The Rohingya have been the target of violence and recent clashes, which has left “dozens dead and tens of thousands internally displaced.”[7] One does not have to look further than the last 8 months to truly see how the regime continues to treat the Rohingya. In June 2012, an outbreak in communal violence between the Buddhist and Muslim Rakhine and the Rohingya lead to massive sweeps resulting in detention of Rohingya men and boys. (Recall the massacre at Srebrenica). Reports indicated that these groups were subject to ill treatment and were held “incommunicado.”[8] In October 2012, satellite images showed that homes of the Rohingya were being destroyed by security forces. The security forces then overwhelmed and cornered the Rohingya to drive them out of the area. This destruction is on top of the gruesome reports of beheading and killing of women and children.[9] (Recall: Rwanda).  The violence has continued in spurts, but is clearly directed at the Rohingya and motivated purely by hatred.

Faced with no other alternatives and with no access to justice in their country, the Rohingya have begun to flee only to be met with rejection from other countries. On the first day of 2013, some members of the Rohingya group were intercepted by Thai authorities and were deported back to Burma.[10] The Thai Navy is under orders to send them away from Thailand. Bangladesh has also expressed that it is not willing to accept Rohingya into their country.

Some countries however are reaching out to the Rohingya. For instance, Malaysia does accept the Rohingya as refugees. Iran recently sent humanitarian aid in order to help and has called upon the UN to take action.[11] Regionally, ASEAN offered to conduct “talks” but that was “rejected.” The regime explained that it sees the escalating violence as an “internal problem.”[12]

After a close examination of these events, the U.S. Presidential visit in November 2012, made the waters murky. President Obama felt that Burma was “moving in a better direction” and that there were “flickers of progress.” During the visit the President met with an advocate of the Rohingya population. While President Obama stated that his visit was not an endorsement of the current government, simple questions arise as to what the U.S. would be willing to do (or not do) to prevent this sectarian violence from escalating.[13] Not surprisingly, after the visit, Thein Sein made 2013 human rights news, when his regime admitted to using air raids against the Kachin rebels who are battling the government for control over certain territories.[14]

Rohingya Refugees

The ICC and its potential involvement

There are two interesting points of discussion that this scenario creates. The first is how the Office of The Prosecutor (OTP) would be able to meet jurisdictional requirements if it were to seriously consider prosecution. The controversial propio motu powers of the Prosecutor would allow her to investigate this situation. Articles 13, 15, and 53 of the Rome Statute require temporal jurisdiction, territorial or personal jurisdiction, and material jurisdiction. In addition, there are requirements in the Statute concerning admissibility. Burma is not a state party to the Rome Statute. The real challenge with this case would be with meeting the territorial or personal jurisdiction elements. Of course the easiest way to meet this requirement would be if the UN Security Council (UNSC) would be willing to refer the case as it did with Bashir of  Sudan.  As stated above, the U.S. Presidential visit does not make clear at this time what the U.S. position would be, especially considering the U.S. also eased sanctions, perhaps as a symbol of new relations, on the regime in November.

Another interesting point of discussion also concerns the potential charges. This author believes that this is a strong case for various charges under crimes against humanity against the Government. Another added dimension to this is that there are also civilians who target the Rohingya and seek to remove them from Burma. Since the posting of this article in January, there has been a recent increase in violence between Buddhist monks, civilians, and the Rohingya.  As previously noted, the regime has continuously called the situation with the Rohingya an “internal problem.”  The situation with the Rohingya can be distinguished from the conflict with the Kachin rebel/soldiers who are fighting for territory and independence.

Some other kind of action is now necessary besides dialogue and commentary from high level UN officials. Our cries of “never again” have become hollow.  The purpose of the ICC should be to facilitate deterrence in addition to punish perpetrators of grave crimes. The international community waits for these situations to become so grave that every action becomes too late. We cannot say we are students of history, when we continually are faced with the same situations over again and repeat the same mistakes. Our ability to ignore tragedy has come at the expense of hundreds of thousands of lives.

Interested in reading more or the full length analysis? Check out: A Road Well Traveled: Religion, Just War, and the Rome Statute, 2(2) A38JIL (2013) 178.

http://www.athirtyeight.com/2013/06/volume-2-issue-2.html

[1] A copy of this report can be found at ICC Coalition website which keeps an excellent record of documents pertaining to the ICC and the OTP: http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=browserdoc&type=14&year=2012

[2] This author questions some of the potential charging decisions being made by the ICC – for instance – the case involving North Korea and South Korea, is a clear act of aggression, but is under examination as a war crime. The death toll in this case is 22 people. The OTP is spending resources in Colombia, to assess whether the government is prosecuting the FARC properly. The author concurs that these cases are worthy of ICC attention, but questions why the ICC wont deal with situations that are ongoing which need immediate intervention. (Besides financial reasons).

[3] The great name debate: the U.S. recognizes the official name of the country as Burma.  Myanmar is the name was introduced by the former military regime, 23 years ago, and is preferred by the current regime. President Obama reportedly did refer to the country as Myanmar out of diplomatic courtesy when meeting with Thein Sein, President  in November 2012. See http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/19/politics/obama-asia-trip/index.html

[4] For a comprehensive report on the Rohingya situation, see Human Rights Watch, “The Government Could Have Stopped This” a report released July 31, 2012 and available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/07/31/government-could-have-stopped . Khaled Ahmed, “Who are the Rohingya?” The Express Tribune, July 31, 2012, available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/415447/who-are-the-rohingya/

[5] Gianluca Mezzofiore, “Myanmar Rohingya Muslims: The Hidden Genocide” August 22, 2012, available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/376189/20120822/burma-myanmar-rohingya-muslims-ethnic-cleansing.htm

[7] UN News Centre, “Independent UN expert calls on Myanmar to carry out latest human rights pledges.” November 20, 2012, available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43550

[8] Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Abuses against Rohingya erode human rights progress.” July 19, 2012, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/myanmar-rohingya-abuses-show-human-rights-progress-backtracking-2012-07-19

[9] Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Satellite Images Show Widespread Attacks on Rohingya” November 17, 2012 available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/17/burma-satellite-images-show-widespread-attacks-rohingya

[10] Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Don’t Deport Rohingya ‘Boat People’” January 2, 2013, available at: http://www.hrw.org/node/112247

[11] Ahlul Bayt News Agency, “Iran to Send 30 tons of Humanitarian Aid to Myanmar’s Rohingyas” January 5, 2013, available at: http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=378800

[12] ALJAZEERA, “Myanmar rejects talks on ethnic violence” October 31, 2012, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/10/2012103161130375846.html

[13] Although I thoroughly question the impact of sanctions and their utility, some sanctions were eased on Burma in the days leading up to the Presidential visit.

[14] See Thomas Fuller, “Myanmar Military Admits to Airstrikes on Kachin Rebels” New York Times, January 2, 2013, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/world/asia/myanmar-military-admits-air-raids-on-kachin-rebels.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&seid=auto&_r=1&. See also Associated Press, “Myanmar’s Kachin rebels accuse government of artillery attack on headquarter city” January 6, 2013, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/apnewsbreak-myanmars-kachin-rebels-accuse-government-of-artillery-attack-on-headquarter-city/2013/01/06/dc668006-57fa-11e2-b8b2-0d18a64c8dfa_story.htm

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November 8, 2012

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Human Rights, Human Trafficking

An Overview of the Italian Response to Child Trafficking

Written by: Noemi Fantoni [1]**

All forms of trafficking in human beings including sexual exploitation of children are universally prohibited.  In order to comply with its international obligations, Italy introduced a number of changes in its criminal legislation, so that it continued to protect the principle of the “best interest of the child.” The offence of sexual exploitation of children was introduced into the Italian Criminal Code only in 1996, by art.609-bis of the Law No. 66 which punishes violent behavior against children. Subsequent legislation was passed again in 1998 which prohibited sex tourism and juvenile prostitution.[2] It was, however, only in 2003 that Law No. 228/2003 on Measures against Trafficking Persons (also called Anti-Trafficking Law) was amended as to include a specific provision of the offence of sexual exploitation of children. This was in order to ensure compliance of the Italian legislation with the treaties and other regional and international obligations that Italy submitted to.   

So what does the Italian legislation aim to accomplish with regards to trafficking of minors? Article 18 of the Immigration Consolidation Act requires creation of a Social Assistance and Integration Programme, which took more than 2 years to bring into existence.  Currently the Programme also serves to penalize the crime of trafficking by using the trafficking definitions found in the Palermo Protocol. All the measures which form the Programme are managed by the Inter-ministerial Committee. The Programme provides several tools, such as:[3] a free Help-line (a national hotline against trafficking) and the “Voluntary Repatriation Programme” which is run by the Italian branch of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in collaboration with the Ministry of Interior which provides programs for temporary assistance and long term social protection.[4]

The main objectives of the free Help-line are to provide detailed information on legislation and services granted to trafficked persons in Italy and, upon request, refer them to the specialised anti- trafficking (THB) agencies. In most cases, the territorial branches of the free Help-line are managed by the same NGOs and public institutions responsible for the implementation of projects funded within the Article 18 Programme. Information is provided in the various languages spoken by the target groups and it is free and active 24 hours since January 2007. The hotline provides assistance and information not only to victim of THB for sexual exploitation but also to victims of trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation.[5]

All local branches provide information in various languages on several issues (immigration law, social and health services, programme of social assistance and integration, etc.); provide psychological support; provide legal advice; assess if the conditions for the application of the Article 18 procedures are in place; provide information about the available accommodation solutions; and place or refer victims to the accredited Article 18 agency located in the geographical area where the victim resides.

Another instrument which has aided Italy in combatting child trafficking is the Osservatorio Nazionale Tratta,[6] an Italian online portal which offers information on various aspects of the THB phenomenon. The portal was established by Department of Equal Opportunity within the European Equal-Project Observation and Resource Centre for THB, coordinated by the Association on the Road in partnership with other NGOs and governmental bodies. The portal is the most updated secondary source on THB issues within Italy (SIRIT – Sistema Informatizzato di Raccolta Informazioni sulla Tratta), where it is possible to complete individual courses for victims accepted under social protection under Article 18 or Article 13 of the Anti-Trafficking Law but its access is restricted. It gathers national statistical data from different institutions and offers an overview of the national and international legal framework against trafficking for monitoring and analyzing this phenomenon.[7]  This is connected with the Anti-Mafia National Direction (Direzione Nazionale Anti-Mafia – DNA) and its local Districts (Direzioni Distrettuali Antimafia  – DDA) which specifically concerns itself with of all crimes in Articles 600 and 601 of the Criminal Code (slavery, servitude, trafficking).[8]

In the last decade, several awareness-raising campaigns have been run in collaboration with the General Directorate of the Italian Cooperation for Progress of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the Department of Rights and Equal Opportunities[9] and with some of the most relevant Italian NGOs. The direct participation of children in awareness-raising efforts is considered particularly relevant by the government, civil society, and NGOs fighting child trafficking.[10] Moreover, the Department for Rights and Equal Opportunities collects some key information on victims of trafficking through project reports that organisations and local authorities send to the Department every six months and on an annual basis.

In fact, the Department for Equal Opportunities every year calls upon the public for project proposals to provide and guarantee proper assistance and protection to trafficked persons. From 2000 to 2010, Department for Equal Opportunities helped to fund a total of 710 projects, in all the Italian regions (out of them 613 long term projects were financed under Article 18 and 97 short term projects under the Anti-Trafficking Law).[11]

In 2010 the Department for Equal Opportunities started to work for the implementation and set up of a National Action Plan, although it became into force only a year after.  The Plan analyzed the specific needs of trafficked/exploited children; it has a gender based approach, has cross-cutting issues to the national strategy to be developed and including minimum standards for protection and standard operating procedure for the referral of victims to the proper service providers. Nevertheless until now the Italian government has not yet appointed a National Rapporteur or equivalent mechanism. The technical board, called the Observatory and National Resource Centre on Trafficking in Human Beings, has the purpose of designing new tools and knowledge and monitoring systems on the different forms of exploitation linked to trafficking, proposing at the same time, liaison tools for different kinds of organisations working at different levels for the protection of trafficked persons and working in combating the phenomenon, for the purpose of influencing  positive policies and interventions in the sector.

Incorporating both short term and long term strategies, the Anti-Trafficking Law provides victims with three to six months of assistance while Article 18 guarantees victims shelter benefits for one year, subject to judicial review. As a matter of fact the law does not specify how often a permit can be renewed, and so it can technically be renewed until the child has reached the age of 18. Article 18[12] grants a special residence permit to foreigners, whatever their age, who are presumed to have been victims of violence or severe exploitation, whose life is at risk as a result of their desire either to escape from the control of criminal organisations or to cooperate with police and prosecutors. A residence permit may be granted without the victim reporting the traffickers, because exploitation and the associated danger for the victim are a sufficient condition for it to be obtained. Foreign child victims of trafficking receive an automatic residence permit until they reach 18 years old. The Italian legal system does not allow the deportation of foreign children below the age of 18, unless the minor constitutes a danger for public or a danger to state security.[13] A similar provision has been recently enacted for unaccompanied minors who are EU citizens.

In the end these victims receive a residence permit for education or for work, allowing them to remain in Italy.[14] The persons (including children) who are part of this Programme benefit from social services, educational provisions, and labour information in order to find a permanent job, while the Anti-Trafficking Law establishes a special aid programme granting on a temporary basis suitable accommodation and food and healthcare.

While the legislation in Italy is multidimensional (it also includes provisions for prosecutions, etc), focusing on the needs of victims and creating preventative efforts, allows for the Italian local communities to engage in combatting this crime, in addition to protecting vulnerable youth, who at times, against their own will, are far away from home.  The world has a responsibility to help those who cannot help themselves and because of their vulnerabilities are targeted so that criminals can make a profit.

[1] Noemi Fantoni is a graduate of the University of Torino (LLM) in 2012 and is currently a trainee with the European Union Parliament in Civil Liberties and Justice Unit. Noemi has worked with various NGO’s relating to child rights, most recently in Mongolia with Amici dei Bambini. She can be reached at noemi.fantoni@gmail.com for more information regarding Italian Child Trafficking laws.

** Unless otherwise noted, the author has translated the laws from Italian into English for the purposes of this post.

[2] Law No. 269, on 3rd August 1998, Norme conto lo sfruttamento della prostituzione, della pornografia, del turismo sessuale in danno di minori, quali nuove forme di riduzione di schiavitù. (http://www.normattiva.it/atto/caricaDettaglioAtto?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=1998-08-10&atto.codiceRedazionale=098G0337).

[3] Associazione On the Road, Isabella Orfano and Marco Bufo, The Italian system of assistance and integration of victims of trafficking in human beings, page. 9. (available in http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/download.action;jsessionid=GRPqPPcYfFkbL7CT7yWgyTVWNvG9gzjhwBBZkH81Rn22j7tLyXZ6!-1401219818?nodeId=e06d5560-83ce-4df1-ae98-832b58224819&fileName=The+Italian+system+of+assistance+and+integration+of+victims+of+).

[4] Idem., page.6.

[6] Web site of Osservatorio Nazionale Tratta –ONT- (www.osservatoriotratta.it).

[7]International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Study on the assessment of the extent of different types of Trafficking in Human Beings in EU countries, April 2010, page.184.

[8] Giuseppina Valentina D’Angelo and Isabella Orfano, European Commission, Italian Report, Law enforcement agencies and NGOs co-operation in the prevention and victim assistance of trafficking in human  beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation (THBSE), Agis Programme 2005,  COOP-TRAF JLS/2005/AGIS/156, page. 19. (available: c.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/download.action;jsessionid=5RLNPvCFWpkSvnKPpy7x9vWPFnhN51WwLLQB9r1JDGqhGpjRLh1F!511069867?nodeId=3c5774ae-4f5a-4bc8-b1c3-7abe2b7e7d32&file).

[9] Prime Minister’s Office, which is the central public authority in charge of promoting and coordinating policies and actions on anti-trafficking, with specific regard to a human rights based and victim centered approach. 

[11]European Commission, Fight Against Trafficking Human Beings, Italy. (available in: c.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/showNIPsection.action;jsessionid=2z1KPlFG8gJLTvHYG66lJ3nXh5T7w8TjmQDpPCSCn9hLLprgYVJ1!511069867?sectionId=688).

[12] The implementation of the programme, pursuit by article 18 of the Law No. 286/1998 (the Immigration Consolidation Act),  are co-financed by the State (70%) and local authorities (30%), coordinated by a special Inter-Ministerial Committee and provided by local authorities  and/or accredited non-profit organizations. The Programme is managed by the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Implementation of Art. 18 of the Law No. 286/1998 (the Immigration Consolidation Act ), the managing body of the Programme, that is composed of representatives of the Department for Rights and Equal Opportunities, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Interior. Idem., page. 34.

[13] Article 19, par. 2, of Italy/Decreto legislativo n. 286/1998 (25.7.1998) available at http://www.giustizia.it/cassazione/leggi/dlgs286_98.html (02.07.2008).

[14] Associazione On the Road, Isabella Orfano and Marco Bufo, The Italian system of assistance and integration of victims of trafficking in human beings. Page. 4. (available in http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/download.action;jsessionid=GRPqPPcYfFkbL7CT7yWgyTVWNvG9gzjhwBBZkH81Rn22j7tLyXZ6!-1401219818?nodeId=e06d5560-83ce-4df1-ae98-832b58224819&fileName=The+Italian+system+of+assistance+and+integration+of+victims+of+).

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November 1, 2012

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Human Rights, Human Trafficking

Calculating the Truth in Human Trafficking

Written by: Dr. T.M. Steinfatt[1]

People gain interest in social issues in various ways. My interest in numbers of trafficking victims began in 1988 during research on health communication and AIDS in Thailand. These HIV/AIDS studies resulted in the book Working at the Bar, a detailed study of the beliefs and behavior of Thai sex workers.[2] In the late 1980s an estimate began circulating in Bangkok that 800,000 children under 18 were working in the Thai sex industry. It originated in print from a single individual employed in Bangkok by the Children’s Rights Protection Center (CRPC) who stated that of 2,000,000 Thai sex workers, 800,000 were children. A Bangkok Post editorial of January 17, 1989, questioned the basis for the estimate, joined by several Thai language media outlets. “Estimate” has two distinctly different meanings in English.

Empirical estimates are based on observed data and can usually be checked for accuracy. But estimate can also mean a guesstimate, a wild guess, as in estimating that the moon is made of green cheese. Many people, including the general public and many of those who write for and edit Western and international media sources, regularly fail to distinguish between the two. The 800,000 children “estimate” was taken essentially as fact in much of the media, and repeatedly publicized to billions of people across the globe. Simple repetition of the claim, with one media outlet quoting another as the source and then being quoted itself as the source, led to belief in and presumed credibility of the claim, severely damaging Thailand’s international reputation.

As an example in 2001, large numbers of sex trafficking victims were said to exist in Cambodia. The statement, presented jointly by several Cambodian NGOs at the 2001 Second World Congress Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation Of Children in Yokohama, Japan, claimed the existence of 80,000–100,000 trafficked women and children per year in Cambodia, with “10,000–15,000 child prostitutes” in Phnom Penh alone.[3] In comparing these numbers with worldwide estimates it seemed unlikely that Cambodia could have 80,000–100,000 of the 700,000 such persons estimated to exist by the US State Department’s first Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report.[4] This would amount to 11–14% of the estimated 700,000 of the world’s cross-border international trafficking total within about 00.194% of the total world population. The most recent TIP Report was released in June 2011.[5]

Numerous other sex trafficking reports on Cambodia cited similar figures at that time. For example, in 2001 the Child Rights Foundation of Cambodia under the heading of “Trends in Sexual Slavery” reported the number of trafficked women and children as “17,000 in Phnom Penh, 30% under 18 years old, 80,000–100,000 nationwide.”[6] Many NGO and media reports published throughout the past decade quote the 80,000–100,000 numbers. Those few providing a reference source for these numbers cite one of those mentioned above, often.[7]

Most current published estimates of the numbers of sex workers, under-aged workers, and trafficked women and children in Cambodia cannot be relied upon. In following the references for the source of the 80,000 to 100,000 figures back to the earliest dated source[8] no study or empirical data in any form can be located to support the number. As with the false claim of 800,000 child sex workers in Bangkok, the presumed propaganda value of large trafficking numbers may be at work.[9] This author is forced to conclude that these 80,000–100,000 numbers are simply bogus, that they were fabricated at some point by someone, and the bogus numbers were simply reprinted, circularly citing other such reprints as the source.

These unsupported estimates of trafficking numbers in Cambodia led to our research there beginning in the summer of 2002 and our first paper.  A Fulbright to Cambodia from January to August of 2003, an extension of that Fulbright, and a research grant from USAID led to additional research and our second empirical paper.  In early 2007, UNIAP/UNESCO in Bangkok announced a competition to determine best methods of measuring human trafficking. My methods proposal received the top award in the UNIAP/UNESCO final competition for best methods of measuring human trafficking, held in Bangkok in November 2007. Data collection for that research, supported by a United Nations grant, began in May 2008 and ended that December, with the final report published by UNIAP/UNESCO in January 2011.  Those studies provide numbers concerning sex trafficking in Cambodia only.

They do not provide numbers representing all forms of trafficking victims. Abuse of female domestic laborers and spousal abuse victims are not included in these numbers, nor are any of the persons trafficked for maritime labor, for begging, for factory labor, or for any male trafficking victims. A 32 point detailed theory and rationale for the methods used in our studies to obtain data on sexual trafficking may be found in our 2011 UNIAP Report. 

Empirical evidence of the size and location of sex trafficking can be obtained through observational research. That evidence indicates sizeable numbers of victims, but substantially smaller numbers than are commonly spread as rumors and propaganda. The numbers of sex workers and of those trafficked is several levels of magnitude smaller than much NGO propaganda usually suggests. The solution is not to promulgate and propagate fake numbers, but to learn to locate and talk with those who are oppressed, listen to what they want and will accept, and to consider carefully both the effect of often brutal interventions on those persons’ lives, and the likely consequences for the returning workers who escaped the raids in terms of future police actions against them and their workplaces.

Understanding the number of persons trafficked in areas targeted for intervention is a requirement in reducing that number by a substantial amount. If numbers of trafficked persons are not known, no accurate measure of the efficacy or of possible negative effects of specific individual anti-trafficking interventions can be known. Obtaining accurate counts of trafficking victims in specific locales and at specific points in time allows evaluation of effectiveness of any anti-trafficking measure applied there. Such numbers create the potential to judge whether trafficking is increasing or decreasing, where, and by about how much, through comparison with later counts. Such data allows tentative inferences based on empirical methods concerning the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of trafficking approaches applied or not applied in the interim. If one does not know the trafficking numbers then there is no good basis for judging effectiveness of interventions. It is not sufficient to know that a particular intervention resulted in a number of captured traffickers and a listed number of trafficked women and children removed to the care of an NGO.

The problem of human trafficking cannot be effectively addressed unless we understand its actual size and which remedies can effectively reduce it. Accurate knowledge of the size and extent of trafficking are needed in order to plan and implement a practical and effective anti-trafficking strategy. Both overestimates and underestimates of the number of victims will result in the failure to allocate resources efficiently, and they may result in the ultimate failure of many anti-trafficking interventions. Overestimates of trafficking numbers may produce prevention and intervention programs that are overly extensive an in the wrong locations, wasting funds provided for anti-trafficking efforts. If guessed numerical estimates are given credence, and the guesses are kept high for funding reasons following an intervention, then an intervention that was effective may be branded as ineffective. Some strong anti-trafficking programs may subsequently be discarded due directly to inaccurate guessed numerical estimates. The effectiveness of interventions cannot be understood accurately without grounded empirical evidence of their effect, whether positive, negative, or neutral. It is important to understand how such guessed estimates appear in the public record in order to consider the validity of such numbers if and when they appear.

[1] Professor at the School of Communication at the University of Miami (Fl). He is also a Fullbright Scholar. For a more complete reading of Professor Steinfatt’s research see “Measuring the Number of Trafficked Women in Cambodia: 2002” Globalization Research Center, University of Hawaii-Manoa (November 13-15,2002). “Measuring the Extent of Sex Trafficking in Cambodia – 2008, SIREN Trafficking Estimates, UNIAP, (January 2011). “Measuring the Number of Trafficked Women and Children in Cambodia: A Direct Observation Field Study” (October 5, 2003).  “Sex Trafficking in Cambodia: Fabricated Numbers versus Empirical Evidence” Crime Law Soc Change (October 28, 2011 online).  He can be reached at: tms@miami.edu
[2] Steinfatt, T. M. (2002). Working at the bar: sex work and health communication in Thailand. Westport: Greenwood Press.
[3] NGO Statement. (2001). NGO Statement to the 2001 Consultative Group Meeting On Cambodia. Available at: http://www.bigpond.com.kh/users/ngoforum/cg2001/child.htm
[4] U.S. Department of State. (2001). Trafficking in Persons Report 2001. Available at: http://www.state. gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2001/index.htm
[5] U.S. Department of State. (2011). Trafficking in Persons Report 2011. Available at: http://www.state. gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/index.htm
[6] CRF. (2001). CAMBODIA: after the first world congress against commercial sexual exploitation of children: contribution to the second world congress in Yokohama, Japan. Phnom Penh: Child Rights Foundation (December). P.14
[7] CRF. (2001). CAMBODIA: after the first world congress against commercial sexual exploitation of children: contribution to the second world congress in Yokohama, Japan. Phnom Penh: Child Rights Foundation (December).
[8] Sophea, M. (1998). Notes of presentation made by Mr. Mar Sophea, National Program Coordinator of IPEC for Cambodia, in, the workshop on Combating the Trafficking of Children and their Exploitation in Prostitution and other forms of Child Labor in Mekong Basin Countries, 31st January 1998, Bangkok. Phnom Penh: ILO/IPEC.

[9] Steinfatt, T. M., (2006). Trafficking, Politics, and Propaganda. Encyclopedia Entry in M. Ditmore (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Prostitution and Sex Work, vol. 2. Greenwood Press, pp. 494–498.