Counter Terrorism : A Democratic Dilemma

Image

 Photo credit:www.picdesi.com

Written by Garima Tiwari
“Terrorism often thrives where human rights are violated,” and “the lack of hope for justice provides breeding grounds for terrorism.”[i]  The recent February 2013 blasts in Hyderabad, India have brought to light the weakness of the intelligence and the laws to create any deterrence. After 9/11, the threat from terrorism has been identified as the most dangerous threat by states. This is because of the unpredictability, widespread reach, lethality and ruthlessness of the attacks. The trend toward higher casualties reflects the changing motivation of today’s terrorists. Terrorist groups lack a concrete political goal other than to punish their enemies.

The Hyderabad blasts are a stark reminder of the shortcomings of Indian counter-terrorism capabilities. Since 2008, India has had 11 more terror strikes in which 60 people have been killed across five cities. The government has taken measures to beef up its security and intelligence agencies. But implementation on the ground is often stymied by India’s notorious bureaucratic red tape. The Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism squad, for example, has a capacity of 935 personnel but is actually working with just 300. A $28.5 million proposal to improve security around Mumbai was announced soon after the 2008 “26/11″ attack—involving 5,000 CCTV cameras at key junctions, motion detectors, night vision for security forces, thermal imaging for the police, and vehicle license plate identification capability. But it never took off. [ii]

The whole counter –terrorism strategy involves a democratic dilemma which consists of two parts. The first is how to be effective in counter-terrorism while still preserving liberal democratic values , and the second is how to allow the government to fulfill its first and foremost responsibility of protecting the lives of its citizens without using the harsh measures at its disposal.[iii] It is generally assumed that the ‘criminal justice model’ is the better option for democracies to overcome the ‘democratic dilemma’ they face. Terrorism inevitably involves the commission of a crime. Since democracies have well-developed legislations, systems and structures to deal with crime, the criminal justice system should be at the heart of their counter-terrorism efforts.[iv] But then special laws with higher deterrence values are required and justified, on the grounds that the existing criminal laws are not adequate to deal with the militancy because what is at stake is the very existence of state and another reason cited is the obligations under the prevailing international environment and obligations like under Prevention of Terrorism Act in India after the 9/11 attack and the UN Resolution 1373. Then there are security forces empowerment laws in India that give immunity and additional special powers to the security forces like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act; Laws of proscription that criminalises terrorist groups and a range of undesirable activities like the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) and other exclusive laws on control of finances, money laundering, drug-trafficking, cyber warfare and so on. [v] Counter-terror laws in India have come into being reflecting the Indian style of handling terrorism – namely, ad hocism. No single law has prevailed throughout. From time to time, depending on the regime at the Center, legislation has come into being and then faded.

When one tries to look at the counter-terror laws of India the following characteristics would come to picture which actually highlight various aspects of where the democratic dilemma is leading:

  1. Hasty enactment without giving much room for public debate or judicial scrutiny;
  2.  Overly broad and ambiguous definitions of terrorism that fail to satisfy the principle of legality;
  3.  Pre-trial investigation and detention procedures which infringe upon due process, personal liberty, and limits on the length of pretrial detention;
  4.  Special courts and procedural rules that infringe upon judicial independence and the right to a fair trial;
  5. Provisions that require courts to draw adverse inferences against the accused in a manner that infringes upon the presumption of innocence;
  6.  Lack of sufficient oversight of police and prosecutorial decision-making to prevent arbitrary, discriminatory, and disuniform application; and
  7.  Broad immunities from prosecution for government officials who fail to ensure the right to effective remedies.[vi]

Despite the experience of 26/11, India’s internal security still remains vulnerable because we have not acquired appropriate capacities and determination to prevent such an exigency. The laws emphasise more on protection of state rather than people. The Indian politicians do not accept national security with the kind of gravitas it demands.[vii] Overall, neither the laws create deterrence nor do they protect the lives of civilian population.

What is needed in not just a strong all encompassing law, but strict implementation and vigilance with respect for human rights.  There have to be proper safeguards against misuse and abuse of law. There has to be clear cut definitions of crimes and penal provisions to avoid excessive discretionary powers. Enactment of special laws should not be in haste; for greater awareness and acceptance, the process has to be transparent and should be subject to public debate and judicial scrutiny. Special laws should possess review mechanisms and ‘sun-set’ clauses for periodic assessments.[viii] Most experts have suggested strengthening policing from the grass root level, enacting tough laws and speedy trial of cases would go a long way in preventing and controlling terror attacks in the country because the terror attacks are often carried out with the help of some local elements. Then again the external factors like politicisation of the police force should be checked to ensure its effectiveness.[ix]

Terrorism is a threat which most states are today facing. We can only defeat terrorism in the long term by preventing the next generation of terrorists from emerging. We must reduce the breeding grounds of terrorism. This is, of course, not an easy task.[x]


[i] Supreme Court of India in People’s union for Civil Liberties vs. union of India, AIR 2004 SC 456, 465

[ii] Hyderabad’s Terror Attack: Speculation Swirls as Critics Point to Government Failure

By Nilanjana Bhowmick Feb. 22, 2013available at http://world.time.com/2013/02/22/hyderabads-terror-attack-speculation-swirls-as-critics-point-to-government-failure/#ixzz2P8YZGrFd

[iii] Excerpt by Boaz Ganor, Trends in International Terrorism and Counter Terrorism, Editors: Dr. Boaz Ganor and Dr. Eitan Azani available at http://www.ict.org.il/Books/TrendsinInternationalTerrorism/tabid/282/Default.aspx

[iv] Lindsay Clutterbuck, “Law Enforcement,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M Ludes (eds.), Attacking Terrorism – Elements of a Grand Strategy (washington, D.C.: Georgetown university Press, 2004), p. 141

[v] Dr. N. Manoharan, Special Laws to Counter Terrorism in India: A Reality Check available at http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/november/20/special-laws-to-counter-terrorism-in-india-a-reality-check

[vi] Anil Kalhan et al, “Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism and Security Laws in India,” Colombia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 20, no. 1, 2006, p. 96.

[vii] C. Uday Bhaskar, former director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, a New Delhi-based think tank available at http://world.time.com/2013/02/22/hyderabads-terror-attack-speculation-swirls-as-critics-point-to-government-failure/#ixzz2P8Y5pFI3

[viii] N. Manoharan, Trojan Horses? Efficacy of Counter-terrorism Legislation in a Democracy Lessons from India, Manekshaw PaPer No.30 , 2011, available at http://www.claws.in/administrator/uploaded_files/1308896190MP%2030.pdf

[ix] Strong local policing, strict laws will curb terror attacks’, Tuesday, 26 February 201, available at http://www.siasat.com/english/news/strong-local-policing-strict-laws-will-curb-terror-attacks

[x] Excerpt Gijs de Vries, Trends in International Terrorism and Counter Terrorism, Editors: Dr. Boaz Ganor and Dr. Eitan Azani available at http://www.ict.org.il/Books/TrendsinInternationalTerrorism/tabid/282/Default.aspx

The ‘War’ against Terrorism: Time now to Change our Paradigm

By Ronald Rogo (rogo.ronald@gmail.com)

Introduction

In October 2011Operation Linda Nchi (Kiswahili for “Protect the Country”) was launched by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF). Operation Linda Nchi was the code name for the military incursion into southern Somalia. The ostensible goal of the military adventures was to crash and hopefully eliminate the threat posed by the Al Shabaab, a terrorist organization operating in Somalia and with reported links to the Al Qaeda terror group. The immediate cause of this unusual turn of events[1] was the kidnapping of two Spanish aid workers working with the Médecins Sans Frontières, an international humanitarian organization, from the Dadaab refugee camp in Northern Kenya. It was alleged that this kidnapping was planned and executed by the Al Shabaab. Although the military incursion in response to the kidnappings did not have an exit date it was apparent from the various press statements by the KDF spokesperson that their immediate goal was to capture the port town of Kismayu. With this it was hoped that the Al Shabaab’s main source of funds and supplies would be cut off and the organization would be crippled. Incidentally, with this military incursion, Kenya joined a growing list of countries that have used the war against terrorism as justification for waging war outside their borders[2].

The initial reports from the government of Kenya were that the incursion was made at the invitation of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG)[3]. However, subsequent reports brought into doubt whether there was active, or even passive, concurrence of the TFG as initially reported and the Kenyan government was forced to engage in hurried face saving diplomatic overdrive measures. Later, the KDF operation was merged with the African Union operation. Financial and material support was also obtained from the United States of America and the European Union among others.

This article will analyze the legal basis for this “war” against terrorism initially started by the KDF. The main thrust of the article is that the war paradigm cannot be used as justification for a “war” against terrorism as it does not fit into the many legal categories of war. Instead, nations need to come up with another perspective when confronting terrorism that will both be tenable and legally justifiable. Operation Linda Nchi will be used as the case study. The incursion of Kenya into Somalia will be the case study.

The Law of Wars

International humanitarian law (IHL) is the branch of law that governs and guides the relations between states that are in a state of war. It is more commonly described as the law of war. As a result, IHL not only stipulates when nations can justifiably go to war (jus ad bellum) but it also governs the conduct of the parties to the conflict when the state of conflict continues (jus in bello). For example, IHL states what types of targets are justifiable and also the amount and type of force that can be used by the parties in order to disarm the adversary. In this regard, the Geneva Conventions[4], to which Kenya is a signatory, are almost universally accepted as the source of these regulations. The Hague Convention is also recognized as a source of IHL, albeit to a smaller extent.

What “War” Against Terrorists ?

It is difficult to acceptably define the term war. Instead, the legal equivalent term of “armed conflict” is usually used in most legal texts. An armed conflict is seen to arise whenever there is “any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces”. This definition presupposes that there are two sides to the conflict who engage in arms in order to resolve their conflict. There is usually a state of armed conflict between two parties. In addition, the traditional view has been that war is generally an international armed conflict that takes place between two nation states, each trying to assert its will on the other. However, as we shall see later, with the increase in the number and intensity of civil wars there has been recognition that there could be a non international armed conflict that occurs between one group and the governing entity.

Based on the above it is doubtful whether one could legally engage in an armed conflict with terrorists. Whereas it is correct that the armed forces of a particular state could be deployed to hunt out, capture and kill terrorists, such as the KDF has done in Somalia, the terrorists do not, in turn, have an armed force that could then result in an armed conflict. In reality any “war” against terrorists does not have the typical ingredients of a battlefield clash; be it in the air, on the land or over the waters. Since terrorists engage in their criminal activities under the cover of ordinary daily occurrences, it is unrealistic to expect them to engage directly with a country’s armed forces. Instead, depending on the particular modus operandi of the particular terrorist organization one would expect that they would attempt to mingle with innocent civilians.

Under IHL the “members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities”[5]. As combatants, the members of any armed forces can therefore be legitimately targeted by the enemy and either be killed or disarmed. This right includes the right to target and kill them even when they are not aware that they are being targeted, so long as the state of warfare continues and so long as the all the other precautionary measures have been considered[6]. However, in relation to anyone who is not a member of the armed forces of a Party remains a civilian and ought therefore not to be targeted in a state of war. Consequently, since the members of the Al Shabaab are not members of the armed forces of Somalia (or do not even pretend to represent the forces of Somalia), they will always, under the prism of law, be seen as civilians. The only time they can be legitimately targeted is when they directly engage in hostilities and therefore lose the cover of protection of the law. Thus any killings, even in a supposed state of warfare, are justifiable on condition that one can prove that the terrorists were directly participating in hostilities during the state of armed conflict.

In addition it is difficult to see how the Kenyan “war” against terrorism fits into any of the currently recognized categories of armed conflicts. These categories are international armed conflicts or non international armed conflicts. Let me analyze these further.

(i) International Armed Conflicts

Common Article 2(1) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is the one that is used to guide the conduct of international armed conflicts. The Article provides as follows:

“the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance”.

While there is no general legal definition for an “international armed conflict” the International Criminal Court (ICC) ruled in the Lubanga case that an armed conflict is of an international character if “it takes place between two or more States”. The court further held that an international armed conflict also “this extends to the partial or total occupation of the territory of another State, whether or not the said occupation meets with armed resistance.”[7] Again, the ICC in the Bemba decision, held that “an international armed conflict exists in case of armed hostilities between States through their respective armed forces or other actors acting on behalf of the State”[8].

Concerning the concept of international armed conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions adds:

Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place. The respect due to the human person as such is not measured by the number of victims[9].

Based on the above it is impossible to characterize the KDF’s invasion of Somalia as an international armed conflict. This is because the two protagonists are not two states, rather a state (KDF) on one hand and a terrorist group (Al Shabaab) on the other hand.

(ii) Non-international Armed Conflict

This categorization was included in recognition of the reality that increasingly more conflicts occur and more deaths occur by reason of conflicts within the nation’s borders rather than by cross border conflicts. Thus according to Common Article 3, the armed conflict not of an international character must occur within the territory of the State[10]. The Additional Protocol II[11], (hereinafter “Additional Protocol II”) in supplementing and further expanding the Common Article 3 also provides as follows:

This Protocol […] shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.

In order for an internal conflict to be qualified as a non international armed conflict and therefore to be covered by IHL there are certain necessary ingredients that must be met. The main one is that the threshold of the conflict must exceed that of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.

Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides that “this Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts”. In applying this provision the ICTY Appeals Chamber decision in the Tadic case held as follows:

“an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there[12]

On the question as to whether a group qualifies as an organized armed group the Akayesu decision held that “[t]he term ‘armed conflict’ in itself suggests the existence of hostilities between armed forces organized to a greater or lesser extent. This consequently rules out situations of internal disturbances and tensions”. Further in the Lubanga decision, while setting out the characteristics of a non international armed conflict the court held that one should consider “the force or group’s internal hierarchy; the command structure and rules; the extent to which military equipment, including firearms, are available; the force or group’s ability to plan military operations and put them into effect; and the extent, seriousness, and intensity of any military involvement”[13]

However, there are still plenty of difficulties with such an assessment in relation to the KDF military adventure. Firstly, in order for a conflict to be characterized as a non international armed conflict, it must “take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party”[14]. This means that the theatre of the conflict should have been in Kenya, not Somalia. While the TFG could make the argument that when it combats Al Shabaab it is engaging in a non international armed conflict, the KDF cannot. Again, it was important to show that the Al Shabaab is “under responsible command, (and that it) exercise(s) such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol[15]. Significantly, the KDF operation cannot meet the requirements of a non international armed conflict on this score too. Apart from repeated isolated attacks in Kenya it cannot be said that the Al Shabaab controlled a part (or any part of Kenya) of Kenya as at the time of the invasion. Further, the KDF has not engaged militarily with any Al Shabaab terrorist groups within Kenya. Lastly, the law requires the military operations of the armed group to be “sustained and concerted”. Although the Al Shabaab has conducted raids on Kenyan soil, it would be a stretch to characterize them as either sustained or concerted.

Conclusion

From the above, it is evident that the use of a war paradigm when describing the invasion in Somalia is tenuous. There is therefore need to rethink the label used. It has been suggested before that any attack by terrorist groups ought to be considered as criminal activities that require police response-even militarized police response-rather than acts of war that require full scale utilization of a nation’s armed forces. In the American case of Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co.[16], the court stated that “The international law definition of war refers to and includes only hostilities carried on by entities that constitute governments at least de facto in character”. Stacie Gorman also stated as follows:

“terrorists are criminals, and not soldiers of war… The practice of trying terrorists in a court of law suggests that the United States has, in the past, recognized that it is limited in its ability to declare war against terrorist groups”[17]

It is my view there was no armed conflict between the KDF and the Al Shabaab. Although it is correct that the Al Shabaab leadership leadership had declared war upon the nation of Kenya and the KDF had done the same in relation to the Al Shabaab these declarations, by themselves, did not mean that a state of armed conflict existed under IHL. Rhetoric does not give rise to a state of armed conflict. Conversely, the lack of any war declarations does not, ipso facto, mean that there is no armed conflict already in existence. It is therefore important for more police action-rather than military activity-to be involved in this “war” against terrorists in the region. The former is not only more efficient as a tool but also legally congruent.


[1]The Kenyan Defence Forces is, by common accord of military observers, the most inexperienced in the region. In a region that is largely known for its perennial conflicts and instability, the KDF is probably the only army in the region that has not engaged in active cross border warfare. Even highly provocative actions such as Uganda’s incursion into Kenyan borders in the Migingo Islands on Lake Victoria, have had mild responses from the Commander in Chief. Further, while neighboring states such as Ethiopia and Uganda have shown an appetite to engage the Al Shabaab in military warfare, the Kenyan government has been reluctant to directly follow this path. Hence, unsurprisingly, the extended disbelief and cynical views in the region when Operation Linda Nchi was launched by the KDF

[2] The United States of America is known for its “war” against terrorism when it invaded Afghanistan in order to rid the country of Al Qaeda elements soon after the September 11 bombings on the World Trade Center in New York. See President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on 20th September 2001 where he stated that “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated” (available at http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/a/bush-war-on-terror-speech.htm-).

[3] See press statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya.

[4] This consists of four treaties and two protocols dealing with the treatment of victims of war. These are the First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1864, the Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1906, the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1929 and the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949. It also includes the Additional Protocol I (1977) relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts and Additional Protocol II (1977) relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.

[5] Article 43(2) of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of victims of International Armed conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (hereafter referred in the text as AP I)

[6] These precautions include only targeting combatants and military objectives, not causing superfluous and unnecessary injury, taking into account all precautionary measures

[7] Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor vs Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-ten, para. 209

[8] Pre-Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor vs Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009, para.223

[9] J. Pictet, (ed.), ICRC Commentary on Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, (ICRC, 1958), p.20. The convention mentioned is further referred to as the “Fourth Geneva Convention”, see UNTS, vol. 75, p.287

[10] The Article reads as follows: “In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (…)”.

[11] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977

[12] ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, “Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction”, 2 October 1995, para.70.

[13] Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor vs Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 Date: 15 June 20009, para. 536

[14] Article 1 of AP II

[15] Ibid

[16] 571 F. Supp. 1460, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)

[17] 20 In the Wake of Tragedy: The Citizens Cry Out for War, but Can the United States Legally Declare War on Terrorism?, 21 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 669 2002-2003

Why it may be time for Truth and Reconciliation for the STL and Lebanon

WRITTEN BY: SEVANE TADEVOSSIAN[1]

In this post I explore the question of whether the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) could benefit from the establishment of a Lebanese Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The establishment of a TRC may be particular useful with regards to its (1) legitimacy, (2) outreach, and (3) rule of law.  To understand the very mixed and complex cultural background where a new tribunal is trying to settle in, it is crucial to have an understanding of the specificity of Lebanon. Indeed, the country has suffered a violent civil war which started in 1975 and lasted more than ten years. Lebanon was occupied by Syria starting in 1982, and Syrian troops were finally withdrawn in 2006, following UN Resolution 1559. However, Syria kept powerful influences in Lebanon through the Hezbollah, a Shia party.[2] There is a multitude of religious groups linked to political parties in Lebanon, the main ones being the Sunni Muslims, the Shia Muslims, the Maronite Christians, the Greek Orthodox, the Druze, and so forth.[3] It is in such a fragile and diverse context that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is trying to bring justice and stability to the country.

On 14 February 2005, a suicide car bomb killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others persons. In response, the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) created on 7 April 2005 the International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) to investigate this terrorist attack. Following these investigations, the UN, in cooperation with the Lebanese government, decided to sign an agreement (the Agreement[4]) to create a Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The latter has a mandate to indict the perpetrators of the 14 February 2005 attack, as well as the perpetrators of eventual subsequent attacks as long as they would be linked to the first attack and would resemble it in terms of its methods and motives. Unfortunately, political killings are very common in Lebanon, thus increasing expectations that the STL finally will help with the peace restoration within the country.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is the last tribunal to have entered the world of international criminal justice. It differs from other similar instances due to its uniqueness, both because of its structure and its mode of functioning. However, the existence of the STL is hotly disputed because of its partial inactivity five years after its entry into force, and especially because of its very poor reception by the Lebanese population.

Legitimacy

One of the main issues of the STL is the debate on why it was established, i.e. questions regarding its legitimacy, as some critics have justifiably stated that the STL is the incarnation of selective justice in the sense that it is only created to find truth and justice for a Prime Minister. Where the STL’s legitimacy, and de facto credibility, is most exposed within the Lebanese population itself and this fact contributes to hindering national reconciliation. Undeniably, the STL divides the population into two camps: for and against the STL.[5] Sunnis and Christians, who form the “March 14 movement,” support the STL, placing high hopes in it to fight against impunity and finally see an end to political assassinations in Lebanon.[6] For both the Sunnis and the Christians, the STL has a symbolic value. On the contrary, the “March 8 coalition,” consisting of the Shia parties Amal and Hezbollah, vehemently oppose the existence of the STL because they suspect it of being an instrument of foreign political powers.[7] Thus, the STL is facing many challenges to its general acceptance by the Lebanese population, particularly owing to the local perceptions from a historical and political context tinged with a long recent civil war.[8] Its legitimacy is flawed, as notes Sheikh Mohamed Hussein Fadlallah:

“How can this tribunal achieve legal results and establish judicial rights when it is rejected by a large segment of the Lebanese population and by Syria? How can its resolution be implemented without creating tension? When we see that the states pushing most for this tribunal are the US, the UK and France, the big question is whether their aim is really to bring the truth or to introduce their interests in the region through it?”[9]

Therefore, I believe it is fundamental for the STL to clearly face the fears and allegations of its critics, first, in order to be able to carry out its mandate thoroughly, and second (if not above all), to calm the tensions it has created within the Lebanese population. Indeed, I think that beyond its mandate, is it also the STL’s duty to bring peace to Lebanon as the mandate of the STL is basically an order to establish justice and peace, albeit limited to the Hariri case but implicitly to the rest of the country as well, knowing the implications of the Hariri case.[10] Besides, the Security Council (SC) established the STL at Lebanon’s request. Therefore, it means that the Lebanese government is searching for specific goals within the convention signed with the SC. Indeed, the SC granted the Lebanese government’s wishes by agreeing to a convention, but the true desire of the government was not only tied to the Hariri case: it was a national plan to find justice. And there is no need to look too deeply into the matter to come to the conclusion that it was made with a view to bring violence and impunity to a halt in order to finally achieve peace and security (the involvement of the SC under Chapter VII of the Charter makes it even more obvious).

At the end, the true issue comes down to ownership. Only the feeling of ownership of the STL by the Lebanese population will establish its much desired acceptance, legitimacy, and credibility. As one scholar stated, “the question of ownership of the tribunal is the decisive question. First and foremost, such a tribunal has value only to the degree in which societies see it as an essential component to clarify past crimes and to rebuild trust in the institutions and improve the rule of law. This being said, the work of a criminal tribunal – even when it is highly successful – is a long process. Nuremberg trials have been perceived from 1946 to the mid-sixties at being a tribunal of victors. It has taken a generation in order that the legacy of the Nuremberg trials became part of the German ethos. To believe that the Hariri Tribunal will be a quick fix to create a common narrative among Lebanese would be a major mistake.”[11]

It tastes bitter to admit that these comments made in 2007 turned out to be true and continues to be so to this day.

Outreach

Outreach is widely connected to legitimacy. Indeed, without a good outreach policy, no explanation can be given concerning legitimacy or further concerns, thus keeping the STL misunderstood. But from this misunderstanding also stems the lack of credibility, the possibility of political manipulations, and so forth. Therefore, it is completely in the STL’s interest to develop outreach towards the Lebanese population, and to be at service for any questions or concerns the Lebanese might have, as at the end of the day, the STL was established to bring justice, peace and stability to the country. And no peace and stability can be maintained in Lebanon if its own population has serious reservations and legitimate doubts about the most important symbol of justice in the country. Even if the STL has developed a strong social media network and its representatives have tried to integrate an international response to its issues, it seems like all these efforts are not enough to justify and convince the Lebanese population on its results, and most importantly on its future existence. Lebanon can get inspired by the process in Sierra Leone where their TRC launched a “sensitization phase” of its program and work in 2002. Again, there is plenty of room for improvement of the STL’s outreach.

Legal culture against impunity: gaining respect for the rule of law

The STL could benefit a great deal from a Lebanese TRC. If a tribunal, i.e. the STL in our case, is the place where the rule of law is to be respected and implemented, it may not have an impact outside of the tribunal. Indeed, resulting from the meager outreach work of the STL, the lessons learned and the principles and values defended in the tribunal may not always be available for the other legal practitioners, let alone the population. It would be very useful and helpful for the Lebanese to set up an institution that would aide them on the workings of the STL, in terms of both its strengths and weaknesses: learn from its mistakes, construct from its successes. In my opinion, the Lebanese rule of law as well as Lebanese themselves would have a lot to gain from such a mechanism: a place where information and updates would be shared, and legal strategies could be discussed; a place where the STL jurists could exchange views with Lebanese jurists, the nationals learning from the internationals, and vice-versa. Indeed, it is not only up to the international jurists to train the local jurists, but maybe to even greater benefit the domestic Lebanese jurists could explain to the internationalized branch of the STL (the STL being a “hybrid” tribunal, i.e. a mix of local and international staff) the local legal culture and norms.

But in case of such an institution never seeing the light of day… could it be possible that local jurists as well as the Lebanese population both simultaneously and mutually strengthen respect for the rule of law via a TRC? If so, this would be a revival of the Lebanese will to fight against injustice. A TRC could be the perfect place where the STL would extend its work outside the persons concerned by its mandate, hence my belief that a TRC could be an interesting tool for the STL and the Lebanese situation as a whole.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone and its TRC

The TRC in Sierra Leone was established on July 7 1999, after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement (1999). The TRC “has been established through an act of Parliament by the government of Sierra Leone, [but it] will be an independent body. The commission was later enacted in 2000 by the President and Parliament.”[12] The TRC in Sierra Leone has two main goals: to investigate the violations, and to restore human dignity to the victims. Its specific mandate is the following: “to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.”[13]

Vargas states that “it is clear that the TRC is not a judicial body; however, since there is a Special Court for bringing to justice those who were the most responsible of violations during the war, the TRC can focus then in a catharsis to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past and not necessarily in finding who the guilty are. The TRC is a fact finding body but with the additional responsibility of setting up a follow-up process to put the country together once more.”[14]

The Moroccan TRC

The Moroccan TRC, called the Instance Equité et Réconciliation (IER), was created on 7 January 2004 by King Mohamed VI to investigate human rights violations such as disappearances and arbitrary detentions that took place between 1956 and 1999 in Morocco. Besides bringing justice to the victims of these violations, part of its mandate is to produce a report on these violations and to suggest various forms of compensations and reparations to the victims. King Mohamed VI further asked the IER to formulate recommendations to help Morocco in preventing the repetition of such crimes.[15] However, some criticism was leveled since grave human rights violations such as torture were not in the TRC mandate. Such criticism is what the STL is currently experiencing on its selective mandate.[16]

Building Bridges Between Mechanisms

Building bridges by making links between mechanisms that have worked and the possibility of creating a TRC is where such a realization might be judged as realistic or not. It could be achieved by relying on concrete measures, tying theory to practice with some guidelines to follow and guarding against repeating mistakes using previous experiences.

Sierra Leone did not refrain from establishing a TRC despite the existence of a special court. Even if it meant that more money was to be spent in the judicial field and that some sectors would lack funding, the government chose to implement a second institution for the quest of truth and justice. No doubt, Sierra Leone was acutely aware that the prolonged division within the population and the feeling of fear, frustration and injustice would bring nothing positive to its future. For Sierra Leone, the resolution of the conflict had no cost. In the end, it is after all a matter of priorities, of which choices to make. I think that Sierra Leone did choose correctly. Lebanon should, for its own sake, take inspiration from Sierra Leone and not be stopped by the existence of the STL. Indeed, judicial apparel was established in Lebanon. However, when it comes to its efficiency, criticisms are being made. Hence the urgency to find some solutions and suggest a complement to its work.

Then, why not base the Lebanese example on the Sierra Leone case? After all, they both have special courts and Sierra Leone still established a TRC despite the existence of a tribunal similar to the STL. Vargas claims that both institutions, i.e. the SCSL and the TRC,   “were created to address, in their own particular way, the same events, and are functioning at the same time. At the end, what it is meant is to answer if this transition process can lead to both: peace and justice.”[17] In addition, Lebanon can get inspired by the process in Sierra Leone where the TRC launched a “sensitization phase” of its program and work in 2002. Again, there is plenty of room for improvement of the STL’s outreach.

Each situation is unique and different. Therefore, I think that it is essential to first identify the challenges and issues, and then proceed with the best solutions fitting this and only this situation. The application of an ICT everywhere is not the answer, and the Lebanese example is the proof. It is important to include the work of not only psychologists, but sociologists and political scientists (in order to understand the sensitive issues in the region) to have a holistic approach and a vision as a whole. Indeed, if only jurists are involved in a process as huge as peace-building and reconciliation, no wonder the system is not working, as law and justice represent a part of the process. Maybe the most vivid example of such a mistake was in Iraq.[18]

CONCLUSION

There are quite a few unsolved issues with regards to the STL in Lebanon. Impunity and justice are still ongoing every day that passes by in which nothing is done to put a halt to them. It seems that Lebanon itself is unable to cure its own wounds, but this country managed to put its ego to one side and bluntly reached out to the international community for help. Thus, it is now the international community’s duty to provide relief in solidarity to the Lebanese population. The Lebanese population plays such a central role in the weight given to any political decision that this is why focus has to be made on the outreach of the STL. The STL needs the population’s support in order to fully complete its mandate. Therefore, its acceptance by the Lebanese is key.

Also, it is essential to keep in mind that the consequences of this tribunal are not limited merely to the legal field, but also apply to every aspect of Lebanese life. Indeed, if there is so much controversy around the STL, it is not because jurists are debating it all over the world. It is because its symbol has repercussions and meaning for everyone, not only in Lebanon, but also beyond Lebanese borders. It instills fear because it is the living proof that justice can be enforced by the SC in any situation, even for only one death. And then looms another fear: what kind of justice is that? Such darkness and misunderstanding generate violent reactions and understandable concerns. It is now up to the STL to face these fears, and I propose that it does so through its outreach and, why not, through a coordinated TRC? However, a TRC may not be the most appropriate option, and therefore further analysis of other forms of mechanisms is needed. No matter what form that mechanism would take, the key word is ownership, as without it any type of institution will fail in its task to make the population connect with the tribunal.

There is something more to be done in Lebanon. For the reasons exposed throughout this research paper, I think the establishment of a TRC that would complement and support the STL’s work is a viable idea. Hence, this eventuality could be explored by experts of transitional justice. To anticipate the Lebanese expectations and reactions, a referendum among the population could serve as a barometer of the reception of such an idea. Now is the time to put into full action the machinery of justice and to put all the chances on the tribunal’s side for the STL to work efficiently. As the former Prosecutor of the ICC Luis Moreno Ocampo states, “silence has never helped or protected victims. Silence only helps the criminals.”[19] Therefore, it is about time that the STL’s silence on the suffering of the Lebanese population ceases, and that finally a mechanism such as a TRC echoes the unheard victims’ voices.


[1] The author is a graduate of the UNICRI 2012, LLM program in International Crime and Justice. You can email the author for more information: sevane.tadevossian@gmail.com

[2] Corm, Georges, “Le Liban contemporain, Histoire et société”, p.302

[3] Corm, Georges, “Le Liban contemporain, Histoire et société”, p.27

[4] The Agreement between the UN and the government of Lebanon for the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (in the « Annex » section of this paper)

[5] See interview with Fatima Sara, Elias Mirza and O. and Iloubnan.com, « Le Tribunal Spécial, un instrument pour susciter les tensions à l’intérieur du Liban », posted on http://www.iloubnan.info/politique/interview/id/48016/titre/Le-Tribunal-sp%C3%A9cial,-un-instrument-pour-susciter-les-tensions-%C3%A0-l-int%C3%A9rieur-du-Liban

[6] See interview with O. and Wierda, M., Nassar, H., Maalouf, L., “Early Reflections on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon” in Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp.1066

[8] See Corm, Georges, « Le Liban contemporain, Histoire et société » et « L’Europe et l’Orient, De la balkanisation à la libanisation, Histoire d’une modernité inaccomplie »

[9] Wierda, M., Nassar, H., Maalouf, L., “Early Reflections on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon” in Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp.1074

[10] See “Extracts” §2

[11] Hazan, Pierre, “Truth-Seeking and Justice in Lebanon and its Repercussion on the Conflict” in Expert Paper “Workshop 9 – Justice Mechanisms and the Question of Legitimacy: Concepts and Challenges”, p.5

[12] Vargas Juarez, Raúl, “The relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone : issues of transitional justice”, p.23; see also Romano, Cesare P.R., Nollkaemper André, Kleffner Jann K., “Internationalized criminal courts and tribunals : Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia”

[13] Truth and Reconciliation Act (2000), section 2 (b)

[14] Vargas Juarez, Raúl, “The relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone : issues of transitional justice”, p.25

[15] Human Rights Watch, “La commission marocaine de vérité : Le devoir de mémoire honoré à une époque incertaine”, p.2

[16] See section  « A mandate of selective justice » of this research paper, p.9

[17] Vargas Juarez, Raúl, “The relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone : issues of transitional justice”, p.2

[18] Hazan, Pierre, « La paix contre la justice ? », p.124

[19] DVD “The Reckoning, the Battle for the International Criminal Court” de Pamela Yates (2009)